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ABSTRACT
Propositions and Paradoxes
by
Dustin Tucker
Chair: Richmond H. Thomason
Propositions are more than the bearers of truth and the meanings of sentences: they
are also the objects of an array of attitudes including belief, desire, hope, and fear.
This variety of roles leads to a variety of paradoxes, most of which have been sorely
neglected. Arguing that existing work on these paradoxes is either too heavy-handed
or too specic in its focus to be fully satisfactory, I develop a basic intensional logic
and pursue and compare three strategies for addressing the paradoxes, one employing
truth-value gaps, one restricting propositional quantication, and one restricting our
ability to have attitudes like belief and desire. This results in four distinct resolutions
of the paradoxes, all but one of which are novel and all of which receive novel and
general implementations. While resolving the paradoxes is of course the ultimate
goal, I do not here argue that any one of the resolutions is superior. These para-
doxes have been so little studied that my primary goal is only to identify the most
fundamental costs and benets of the various approaches one can take to addressing
them. Each resolution I develop has signicant drawbacks, which I argue highlight
tensions between the dierent roles propositions play. Past researchers have skirted
these tensions, and the issues raised by these paradoxes more generally, by focusing on
non-propositional paradoxes, such as the most familiar forms of the Liar paradox. At
the least, then, I hope this dissertation establishes that the propositional paradoxes
deserve attention not only because of their consequences for intensional logic, but also
because of their consequences for our understanding of content, truth, quantication,
and a host of mental attitudes.
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CHAPTER 1
Propositions and paradoxes
1.1 Paradoxes
Most philosophers are aware that (1) leads to problems, but working through the
details of the paradox will be worthwhile.
Epimenides, a Cretan, said that everything any Cretan says is false. (1)
We can suppose that (1) is true. If Epimenides has said that everything any Cretan
says is false|if (1) is true|then he has said something false: surely some Cretan
sometime has said something true. We encounter problems only when we suppose
that (2) is also true.
Everything else any Cretan says is false. (2)
We can again ask whether Epimenides has said something true. Now, however,
there is no obvious answer. Epimenides has said (3).1
Everything any Cretan says is false. (3)
Is (3) true? Suppose that it is|suppose that everything any Cretan says is false. We
know from (1) that (3) has been said by a Cretan, so (3) is false. Thus, if (3) is true,
then it is false. Anything whose truth implies its falsity must be false, so we have
proved that (3) is false. Thus, at least one thing a Cretan says must be true. From
our supposition of (2), that one thing must be what Epimenides says according to
1This is not quite correct: (3) is a sentence of English, and Epimenides did not speak English.
I address this below.
1
(1). That's (3), so (3) must be true. But now we have proved that (3) is both true
and false; something has gone wrong.
1.2 Propositions
The Epimenides paradox is often taken to be merely an unnecessarily compli-
cated form of the Liar paradox, by which I mean the paradox involving (4), the Liar
sentence.
(4) is false. (4)
The Liar is similar in structure to the Epimenides paradox. Suppose that (4) is true.
Then it is true that (4) is false. That is, (4) is false. So if (4) is true, then it is false.
Anything whose truth implies its falsity must be false, so (4) is false. Thus, in virtue
of what (4) says, it is false that (4) is false|(4) is true. So we have proved that (4)
is both false and true. Again, something has gone wrong somewhere.
In both of these cases, we have a genuine paradox. Beginning with intuitively
consistent assumptions|e.g., that (1) and (2) are both true|and taking intuitively
valid steps, we have proved contradictions. Thus, there can be no completely satis-
factory resolution: some of our intuitions must be reined in somewhere. The task in
constructing a resolution of these paradoxes is to minimize such concessions.
One might hope that this task could be at least mostly accomplished for the Epi-
menides by adapting existing work on the Liar. But the Liar deals only in sentences,
while the Epimenides says nothing about sentences at all, and this dierence is cru-
cial. The Liar paradox shows that no language can contain its own sentential truth
predicate|a predicate that holds of all and only those sentences that are, in fact,
true, or satised by a model. Because of this, and in order to distinguish this form
of the Liar from others, I call this form the satisfaction Liar.2
The Epimenides, on the other hand, is not concerned with the satisfaction of
sentences at all. (1) involves indirect, rather than direct, discourse: the complement
of `said' is a used, not mentioned, phrase of English, and thus (1) means something
very dierent from the sentence
Epimenides, a Cretan, said, \Everything a Cretan says is false."
2Though this is the most commonly addressed analysis of (4), it is not the only one: some authors
claim that `true' and `false' are not properly predicated of sentences, but of propositions, which
sentences express. (4) then means something along the lines of \(4) expresses a false proposition."
I discuss this form of the Liar in Section 2.3.
2
Properly speaking, I should have said not that Epimenides said (3), but rather that
Epimenides said what (3) says. Or, more awkwardly but more precisely: Epimenides
said the meaning (or denotation) of (3). (1) does not claim that Epimenides uttered a
sentence of English; it claims that he has said (in the indirect sense) whatever English
that-clauses denote.3 I call those denotations propositions, and I use slanted type to
emphasize that a certain sentence or clause refers to a proposition. Thus, when I say
that Epimenides said the denotation of (3), I mean to say that Epimenides said the
proposition that everything a Cretan says is false.
I remain as neutral as possible on the question of what propositions are. Per-
haps they are sets of possible worlds. Perhaps they are primitive abstract entities,
or structured objects made up of more primitive entities, such as properties and in-
dividuals. Perhaps they are something else entirely. All I suppose is that they are
truth-bearers and can be the objects of propositional (or intensional) attitudes, such
as speech, belief, thought, desire, and fear. I call the Epimenides and its ilk (as well
as some other paradoxes that are crucially concerned with propositions) intensional
paradoxes. I sometimes call the non-intensional paradoxes extensional paradoxes.
Nevertheless, I assume throughout that talk about propositions is never a mistake.
The easiest way for this to be true is for propositions to exist, but there may be other
ways. All I mean to say is that I am, for the purposes of this dissertation, setting
aside the possibility of some sort of nominalist or anti-realist theory of propositions.
Perhaps talk about propositions is merely one useful but imperfect way of describing
certain phenomena, such as certain mental states. In that case, the paradoxes do
nothing more than highlight those circumstances in which such talk breaks down,
and the present project is merely an investigation into which portions of such talk we
can salvage when as a whole it can be taken no further. But again, for the purposes
of this dissertation, I ignore this possibility.
1.3 My goals
These intensional paradoxes have been largely (though by no means entirely) ne-
glected. This dissertation is concerned mainly with ve intensional paradoxes, which
I present in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I discuss three dierent approaches to the para-
doxes. The rst brings truth-value gaps to bear on the problem, as Anthony Ander-
son and Tyler Burge have suggested; the second considers various ways of restricting
3This is a very simplistic treatment of sentences of indirect discourse, but I think that it is
harmlessly so. As I explain in the next paragraph, I do not assume very much about the denotations
of that-clauses.
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the domain of propositional quantication, loosely following many authors, including
Russell, William Kneale, Charles Parsons, George Bealer, and Michael Glanzberg;
and the third follows Arthur Prior in insisting that sometimes certain propositions
simply cannot be the objects of certain propositional attitudes. In Chapter 4, I detail
the logic that I use throughout the dissertation and formalize the rst four paradoxes.
In Chapter 5, I provide novel implementations of the approaches using that logic. In
Chapter 6, I turn to the fth and nal paradox. Finally, in Chapter 7, I discuss the
benets and detriments of the dierent resolutions.
I do not mean to argue for one resolution or another. The intensional paradoxes
are, I think, symptomatic of a fundamental inconsistency in our intuitions and as-
sumptions about propositions. By showing how the approaches can be rigorously
implemented at a very basic level, we better isolate the problematic intuitions and
better understand how they can be reined in to avoid contradictions. I argue that
ultimately, tensions between propositions' roles as the objects of attitudes, the bear-
ers of truth, and the meanings of sentences force us to make choices that do not arise
when studying only the extensional paradoxes. If, for instance, it is constitutive of a
proposition that it has a truth value, then the truth-value gap approach is nonsense.
But if one takes the object-of-attitude role to be fundamental, truth-value gaps might
seem to be the best option, while the other two approaches begin to lose their appeal.
Neither do I pretend to construct even one satisfactory account of the intensional
paradoxes, let alone intensionality more generally. In general, I raise many more
questions about these resolutions than I attempt to answer. But very little has been
done with these paradoxes, and my aim is to provide the beginning of more systematic
research into their resolution, not the end.
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CHAPTER 2
Intensional paradoxes
2.1 The complex Epimenides paradox
One particular two-person version of the Epimenides will be useful. Suppose that
(5){(8) are true.
I fear that everything you hope is false. (5)
You hope that everything I fear is true. (6)
Everything else I fear is true. (7)
Everything else you hope is false. (8)
(5) says that I am, in virtue of my fears, related somehow to the proposition denoted
by (9), and (6) says that you are, in virtue of your hopes, related somehow to the
proposition denoted by (10).
Everything you hope is false. (9)
Everything I fear is true. (10)
Adapting notation from Section 4.2, I abbreviate \the proposition denoted by (9)"
with \[[(9)]]" and so on, and in the interest of simplicity, I use `fear' and `hope' as
slightly awkward transitive verbs. Thus, I say things like \I fear [[(9)]] and you hope
[[(10)]]" with the understanding that we can, if we wish, rewrite them so as to not
presuppose a potentially simplistic and archaic understanding of attitudes.
A situation in which (5){(8) are true seems to be easy to imagine.4 Perhaps (5)
I am afraid that all your hopes are bound to be disappointed, (6) you don't like me
4Of course, the particular attitudes and agents are unimportant.
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much and hope that I'm living in a nightmare, and both (8) my fear and (7) your
hope are at least almost correct. Unfortunately for our imaginations, however, we
can prove from these four assumptions that (the propositions denoted by) (9) and
(10) are each both true and false.
Suppose that [[(9)]] (the proposition denoted by (9)) is true|that everything you
hope is false. By (6), you hope [[(10)]], so it must then be false. But [[(10)]] is the
proposition that everything I fear is true, so since it's false, something I fear must be
false. By (7), the only possible witness to this is [[(9)]], so [[(9)]] must be false. Thus,
on the supposition that [[(9)]] is true, we have proved that it is false. Anything whose
truth implies its falsity must be false,5 and so we know that [[(9)]] is false. [[(9)]] is
the proposition that everything you hope is false, so if it's false, then something you
hope is true. By (8), the only possible witness to this is [[(10)]], so [[(10)]] is true. But,
once again, [[(10)]] says that everything I fear is true. By (5), I fear [[(9)]], and so it
must be true. And now we have proved that [[(9)]] is both true and false.
We can here see one main dierence between intensional and extensional para-
doxes. It will not do to simply prohibit sentences like (9) and (10) or insist that they
do not denote propositions. As long as the propositions themselves are there to be
the objects of attitudes and the bearers of truth, we can derive the contradiction.
2.2 The complex Prior paradox
Arthur Prior focuses exclusively on one family of intensional paradoxes in [Pri61].
One of the paradoxes he briey discusses involves a situation in which he says that
either what Prior is now saying or whatever Tarski says immediately after, but not
both, is false and Tarski says that snow is white and nothing else immediately after
Prior speaks [Pri61, p. 29]. We then ask whether Prior has said something true or
false: we have a paradox whenever Tarski says something true, but when he says
something false, what Prior says becomes a sort of truth-teller, and can be either true
or false without trouble.
I will be concerned with a slightly more problematic paradox. To the best of my
5Barring truth-value gaps, which we will do until Chapter 3.
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knowledge, (11) was true a few years ago.6
I am now thinking and thinking only that everything I am
thinking is false if and only if someone else bears a propositional
attitude towards something at some time in the future.
(11)
Now we have a paradox as long as anybody else has thought, feared, known, said,
asserted, etc. any proposition whatever in the last few years. More specically, when
(11) and (12) are true|and they seem to me to be consistent, at least, perhaps with
some rewriting to x the tenses|we can prove that [[(13)]] is both true and false.
You said that snow is black. (12)
Everything I was then thinking is false if and only if
someone else bore a propositional attitude towards something.
(13)
Snow is black. (14)
To prove this, we prove that the (proposition denoted by the) left-hand side of
the biconditional in (13) is both true and false given that the (proposition denoted
by the) right-hand side is true. This derivation parallels the one for the complex
Epimenides paradox, so I omit it.
2.3 The expression Liar paradox
One intensional form of the Liar that has received some attention in the Liar
literature7 is what I call the (strengthened) expression Liar.
(15) does not express a true proposition. (15)
Here, we seem to be able to prove that it is both true and false that (15) expresses
a true proposition. As with the other intensional paradoxes, though, this does not
involve any satisfaction predicates|we are talking about the truth of a proposition,
not of a sentence. Again, the derivation is almost identical to what we have seen, so
I omit it.
I will not say much about this paradox directly until Section 7.1 because the
truth-value gap and quantier domain restriction resolutions that I develop transfer
6This thought was inspired by a form of the paradox presented in [Tho88], which was itself
inspired by Prior's paradox.
7It is, for instance, the main focus of [Kne72, Par74, Gla04].
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immediately to this paradox, once we include an expression relation in our logic.
But this paradox is still important, not least because it does not obviously involve
any propositional attitudes, and thus poses a problem for any resolution like Prior's,
which relies on restricting propositional attitudes to explain the paradoxes.
This paradox is also important because it is a strengthened paradox. Perhaps we
can comfortably say that the sentence, \This sentence expresses a false proposition,"
fails to express a proposition at all, or expresses a proposition that lacks a truth value.
But no such easy solutions are available for (15). I ignore this issue until Section 7.2.
2.4 The proposition Liar paradox
This paradox is the main concern of [BE87] and [Gro94]. I call it the proposition
Liar, rather than the much more natural propositional Liar, because there are other
ways to introduce propositions into the Liar paradox (cf. the expression Liar). It
involves a proposition that is identical to its own negation, which of course leads
directly to a paradox so long as propositions and their negations must have dierent
truth values. As I explained above, I do not want to make any assumptions about the
nature of propositions if I can help it, so while such a proposition might be unusual,
I do not want to assume without argument that it is impossible.
2.5 The Appendix B paradox
This paradox was rst presented by Russell in the end of Appendix B of [Rus03].8
For each set S of propositions, there is the proposition that every proposition in S
is true; call this proposition s. It is plausible that each s is unique to its S|that if
s = s0 then S = S 0. Of course, if this is true|if we can, in fact, construct a unique
proposition for each set of propositions|then we have violated Cantor's theorem, and
a contradiction must be waiting in the wings. As Russell observes, we can consider
the set of all the ss that are not contained in their corresponding S; call this set T .
We can prove that the proposition that every proposition in T is true both is and is
not a member of T .
Variations of this paradox replace sets with properties, pluralities, and proposi-
tional functions. The last will be my initial focus in Chapter 6, but I discuss other
8John Myhill later presented a related paradox in [Myh58], but I restrict myself Russell's original
paradox and variations thereon. This paradox has always received some attention, including recently
[Deu08, Kle01], but it has been largely ignored by authors attempting to construct resolutions of
paradoxes.
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versions as well.
2.6 Other paradoxes
There are several other intensional paradoxes that I will not directly address be-
cause they are, for my purposes, equivalent to the rst four paradoxes.
In [And87], Anthony Anderson considers a situation in which Church's favorite
proposition is the proposition that Church's favorite proposition is false. But he
formalizes this with a denite description|the proposition which is Church's favorite
is the proposition that the proposition . . .|and once we have that, any resolution
of the complex Epimenides and Prior paradoxes, which involve quantication, should
carry over so long as we treat quantiers and other determiners in relevantly similar
ways.
We can also construct an intensional version of Grelling's classic paradox, accord-
ing to which a predicate is heterological if and only if it denotes a function from
predicates to propositions and the result of applying it to itself denotes a false propo-
sition. But this is not importantly dierent from the expression Liar.
Finally, Yablo's paradox from [Yab93] involves an innite sequence of sentences,
each of which says that all the later sentences are false. As with the proposition Liar,
I want to focus on a purely intensional form of Yablo's paradox|a paradox that arises
from assumptions about propositional identity. Roughly, the idea is to have an innite
series of propositions, each of which is the proposition that every proposition later in
the series is false. One might think that this involves propositional quantication, and
is thus not importantly dierent than the complex Epimenides and Prior paradoxes.
Formally, though, we can quantify over the arguments to a propositional function
and thereby talk generically about a class of propositions without quantifying over
propositions directly. I revisit this issue in Section 5.3.3.
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CHAPTER 3
Three strategies for resolving the paradoxes
3.1 Truth-value gaps
In light of similar approaches to the satisfaction Liar, one might say that the rel-
evant propositions in the intensional paradoxes are neither true nor false. I am not
the rst to consider truth-value gaps as a resolution of the intensional paradoxes. Of
course, truth-value gaps have been heavily discussed in the literature on the satisfac-
tion Liar|for some of the earliest discussions, see, e.g., [vF68, Kri75, MW76, Her76]|
but their application to the intensional paradoxes has also been proposed, though not
developed in any detail, by Tyler Burge [Bur79, Bur84],9 and developed in great detail
by Anthony Anderson in [And87].
Nevertheless, I do not want to work with Anderson's version, because he uses a
version of Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. This is not a problem in
itself, of course, but I think that it disguises the generality of the resolution. One
need not assume anything like a Fregean treatment of propositions in order to resolve
the paradoxes with truth-value gaps; my insistence on assuming as little as possible
about the nature of propositions is intended to show this.
Once we give that up, though, we lose all of Anderson's developments. We need a
principled, systematic way of ensuring that all and only the problematic propositions
lack truth values, even in the more complex multi-agent cases. Anderson himself does
not discuss these paradoxes, but I do not mean to say that Anderson has not provided,
or at any rate could not construct such a resolution of the complex Epimenides and
Prior paradoxes. But once we have left the Logic of Sense and Denotation behind,
we must start from scratch. These details will be all the more important because I
use the truth-value gap treatment of these more involved paradoxes as the basis of
9Burge also proposes some contextualist machinery, which I discuss in Chapter 7.
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the other resolutions.
At an informal level, once we allow propositions to lack truth values, it is easy to
see how even the multi-agent paradoxes should be resolved. Recall, for instance, the
complex Epimenides paradox.
I fear that everything you hope is false. (5)
You hope that everything I fear is true. (6)
Everything else I fear is true. (7)
Everything else you hope is false. (8)
Everything you hope is false. (9)
Everything I fear is true. (10)
In Section 2.1, we began our derivation of a contradiction from (5){(8) by supposing
that the object of my fear, [[(9)]], was true, which entailed that [[(10)]] was false, which
entailed that [[(9)]] was false. At this point, we concluded that [[(9)]] was not true, on
pain of contradiction, and so had to be false. It is the last step that this approach
blocks|if propositions can lack truth values, then we cannot conclude that [[(9)]] is
false from our proof that it is not true. Indeed, we can prove that it is not false
through reasons very similar to the second half of the proof in Section 2.1, and so,
according to this approach, [[(9)]] is gappy (and so is [[(10)]]).
There are a number of ways one can treat truth-value gaps. I use the strong
Kleene scheme extended to quantication following [Kri75], so that a conjunction is
true i both of its conjuncts are true, false i one of its conjuncts is false, and neither
otherwise; an existential quantication is true i one of its instances is true, false
i all of its instances are false, and neither otherwise; and so on. I spell this out
precisely in Section 4.2, but for now it is worth observing its consequences for the
four paradoxes under immediate consideration. The proposition Liar is immediately
resolved, because no proposition that is identical to its own negation can have a truth
value. And the expression Liar is almost as simple: [[(15)]] will always lack a truth
value as well.
(15) does not express a true proposition. (15)
Since a universal quantication cannot be true unless every instance is true, and
can be false only when there is a witness to its falsity, it is also nearly immediate,
given the reasoning above, that both [[(9)]] and [[(10)]] will always lack truth values
when (5){(8) are true. And nally, we will never be able to assign a truth value to
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[[(13)]] when (11) and (12) are true, though of course there will be no trouble assigning
a truth value to [[(14)]].
I am now thinking and thinking only that everything I am
thinking is false if and only if someone else bears a propositional
attitude towards something at some time in the future.
(11)
You said that snow is black. (12)
Everything I was then thinking is false if and only if
someone else bore a propositional attitude towards something.
(13)
Snow is black. (14)
One important foundational task facing any truth-value gap resolution, which I
mentioned above when discussing Anderson's resolution, and which is easy to overlook
if one begins with the work on the satisfaction Liar, is to systematically determine
which propositions lack truth values and which ones do not. In the interest of nding
the least intrusive resolution, the last part is important: we do not want more truth-
value gaps than are necessary. Kripke addressed this task, among others, for the
satisfaction Liar in [Kri75]. But we cannot straightforwardly adopt his xed-point
construction, because it relies on the structure of sentences. For instance, he relies
on being able to distinguish the sentences \Snow is white" and \ `Snow is white' is
true" from each other, but I do not want to assume that the proposition that snow
is white is dierent from the proposition that the proposition that snow is white
is true, because as I said in Section 1.2, I want to be as silent as possible on the
nature of propositions. Happily, we will see in Section 5.2 that we can avoid such an
assumption, given the setup in Chapter 4.
Of course, the truth-value gap approach raises other questions. When, in re-
sponse to the satisfaction Liar, one proposes that certain sentences lack truth values,
one might imagine those sentences simply failing to express propositions in the rst
place. In contrast, when one proposes that propositions themselves lack truth val-
ues, one risks resolving the problems for propositions qua objects of attitudes only
by introducing problems for them qua bearers of truth. But I want to set this issue
aside until Section 7.3, as I explained in Section 1.3. Certainly any fully satisfactory
account of intensionality that relies on truth-value gaps to address the intensional
paradoxes must have an explanation of what it means for truth-bearers to lack truth
values. But the more foundational task from the preceding paragraph is no less im-
portant, and answering it also turns out to be crucial for my implementations of the
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other resolutions.
3.2 Quantier domain restrictions
An alternative to allowing truth-value gaps is insisting that the domain of propo-
sitional quantication is restricted (perhaps contextually, perhaps in some other fash-
ion; I briey discuss this issue in Section 7.2). One of the earliest earliest instances of
this approach is the ramied theory of types, which I discuss at length below. This
theory was rst developed by Bertrand Russell, with the most inuential statement of
it appearing in [WR13], and a handful of authors [Chu93, Kap95, Tho88] have since
proposed ramication as a resolution of (some of the) intensional paradoxes.
Other authors have considered restricting propositional quantication to avoid
paradoxes, but their suggestions are consistently either too narrow in their focus or not
detailed enough to guarantee the right results in the trickier multi-agent paradoxes.
George Bealer [Bea82, pp. 99{100] and Sten Lindstrom in [Lin03b] fall into the latter
category: while they suggest that the correct resolution of the paradoxes is to say that
the propositional quantiers are restricted, they do not explain how this restriction
goes. Bealer, for instance, says that context xes the domain, but does not explain
how. Lindstrom provides more detail in [Lin03a], but the resulting theory is similar
enough to ramication that the concerns I raise below about the latter apply to
his proposal as well. Bealer later says that he actually prefers an approach \based
on xed-point ideas developed by [Fitch, Gilmore, Feferman, and Kripke]" [Bea94,
p. 162],10 which sounds something like the resolution I ultimately develop (as well as
something like Michael Glanzberg's resolution of the expression Liar, which I explain
below). Again, though, he does not provide any details of a resolution based on these
ideas.
Michael Glanzberg's resolution of the expression Liar [Gla04] makes use of Krip-
kean xed points to implement a restriction on the domain of quantication, and so
might be thought of as a spiritual successor to Bealer's suggestion. But Glanzberg's
approach is actually more of a spiritual successor to ideas presented byWilliam Kneale
and Charles Parsons [Kne72, Par74], and is thus much more narrow in its focus than
Bealer's. Kneale and Parsons both think that truth is ultimately properly predicated
of propositions, not sentences, and thus that the Liar sentence (4) is really to be taken
10See [Bea94] for the references.
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as the expression Liar sentence (15).
(4) is false. (4)
(15) does not express a true proposition. (15)
Glanzberg takes the same approach. But all three authors focus heavily on proposi-
tions as what sentences express. This fact plays a crucial role in Glanzberg's resolution
of the expression Liar: he proposes that we identify the propositions that must be
kept out of the domain of quantication by way of a predicate that holds of sentences
and Kripkean xed points.
Glanzberg does not think that this is a problem, writing,
If we apply truth to propositions, then for most applications of the truth
predicate we will make, we will have to work with a proposition presented
via a sentence that expresses it. Though we might sometimes manage to
name a proposition in some more or less direct way, we usually wind up
saying something like `the proposition expressed by sentence s is true', or
more informally, `what she said when he [sic] said s is true'. [Gla04, p. 31]
But here I think that Glanzberg is underestimating our ability to talk directly about
propositions. We can easily do so with indirect discourse, as illustrated by the abun-
dance of that-clauses in this dissertation, often written in slanted text to avoid con-
fusion. Unfortunately, because of this focus on sentences and the expression relation,
Glanzberg's resolution is silent on all the non-expression paradoxes|one cannot even
formulate them in his logic. Although Kneale and Parsons do not provide as much
detail as Glanzberg, their proposals are similarly limited.
I do not mean to say that Glanzberg's proposal is hopeless in the face of the other
intensional paradoxes. He might very well extend his system to address them. But I
think that to do so he would have to make assumptions about the structure of mental
states, or a language of thought, or something along those lines, and these would not
be in line with my attempt to remain as neutral as possible about propositions and
the surrounding issues. I do not think that we need to make such assumptions simply
to resolve the paradoxes, and so I do not want to pursue Glanzberg's approach.
That said, Glanzberg's emphasis of sentences is not without its benets. In par-
ticular, it allows him to give a nice contextualist explanation of several important
issues surrounding the expression Liar. I discuss this in more detail in Section 7.2.
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3.2.1 Ramication
Ramication11 is fundamentally a theory of quantication. It says that no propo-
sition can quantify over itself (or over propositions that can quantify over it, etc.).12
Slightly more carefully, so as to not assume that propositions themselves contain
quantiers, it says that that there is an innite hierarchy of orders of propositions,
and that if a sentence (or, even more carefully, a formula P) denotes a proposition
of order n, quantiers in the sentence (P) can range over only orders m < n. I often
speak loosely of propositions themselves quantifying with the understanding that such
talk can be avoided if necessary. I also assume, contrary to Russell's version of rami-
cation but in line with Church's, that orders are cumulative, so that propositions of
order n also appear in all orders m > n.
Ramication avoids the rst three intensional paradoxes: the complex Epimenides,
the complex Prior, and the expression Liar. Consider the complex Epimenides once
again.
I fear that everything you hope is false. (5)
You hope that everything I fear is true. (6)
Everything else I fear is true. (7)
Everything else you hope is false. (8)
Everything you hope is false. (9)
Everything I fear is true. (10)
In the argument in Section 2.1, it was crucial that [[(9)]] was in the range of the
quantier in (10) and [[(10)]] was in the range of the quantier in (9). But this is not
possible in a ramied theory of propositions. Ramication requires that all quantiers
be restricted to an order, so we must replace (9) and (10) with (90) and (100). (We
must replace (5){(8) as well, but for simplicity's sake I omit the replacements here
and suppose that the quantiers in (7) and (8) range over orders higher than n and
m.)
Everything of order n you hope is false. (90)
Everything of order m I fear is true. (100)
11Throughout, I work with Church's formulation of ramied type theory [Chu76]. I do not mean
to claim that this is a perfectly accurate reconstruction of Russell's own theory, but it is close enough
for my purposes.
12It also concerns quantication over propositional functions, which I address in Chapter 6.
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[[(90)]] and [[(100)]] are of at least orders n+ 1 and m+ 1 respectively, and so one will
denitely be outside the range of the quantier in the other. Suppose, for instance,
that n > m (the other two cases are equally straightforward). Since I am letting
orders be cumulative, anything of order m+1 will be of order n, and so the quantier
in (90) ranges over [[(100)]]. When we suppose that [[(90)]] is true, then, we can still
conclude that [[(100)]] is false|that something I fear of order m is false. But the proof
can go no farther: [[(90)]] cannot be in order m (because it must be of at least order
n+ 1 and n > m).
I am not quite satised with ramication in its traditional form, as I explain in
the next subsection. But before moving on, I want to set aside (until Section 7.3)
two worries about ramication of any form. One major issue involves quantication.
In a ramied theory of propositions, even the more exible one I describe in the next
subsection, it could very well be impossible to quantify over every proposition|there
might be no universal order, which contains every proposition. This should be cause
for concern, because we seem to be able to make claims about every proposition.
According to ramication, for instance, every proposition has an order. But if there
is no universal order, then the preceding sentence cannot have expressed what I
intended, and the object of that intention is not what you might have thought, and
the content of that thought is not what you tried to make it, and so on.
This is not a new objection to ramication, but it is still an important one.
It is, in a way, the problem of providing a universal metalanguage for our theory
combined with the challenges facing unrestricted quantication.13 But the problems
are compounded when we are dealing with propositions, supposedly the fundamental
bearers of truth.
One might also worry about the orders. Where do the n and m in (90) and (100)
come from? Are they contextually supplied? If so, what is contextually sensitive?
Something in our mental state? And what can propositions look like if they can
sometimes dier in only the orders over which they quantify (more carefully: in only
the orders over which quantiers in sentences that express them quantify)?
Both of these issues are important, and a proponent of ramication must ulti-
mately address them. But as I have emphasized, my purpose here is to see how far
the approach can be taken (and in particular to show that we can give ramication a
lighter, more discerning touch), and to identify the costs such an approach must pay
at the most fundamental level. I do not mean to argue that ramication is denitely
13For an early discussion of universal metalanguages, see [Fit64]. For the problems with quanti-
cation, see, e.g., [RU06].
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the correct approach to the paradoxes. As with the concerns about truth-value gaps,
I revisit these issues in Section 7.3.
3.2.2 Compressed ramication
As we saw, ramication resolves the complex Epimenides, and it equally well
handles the complex Prior and the expression Liar. (More on the proposition Liar
in Section 3.2.4.) But it is heavy-handed. It prohibits all circular quantication all
the time, and most circular quantication is unproblematic in most circumstances.
This observation is analogous to one of Kripke's [Kri75, xII], and the present proposal,
compressed ramication, stands to traditional ramication in much the same way that
Kripke's single truth predicate stands to Tarski's hierarchy. One of the troubles with
Tarski's hierarchy of languages is that it prohibits all talk about truth from within
an object language. It is, in a way, the ultimate truth-value gap theory: within
a language, the truth predicate for that language is entirely gappy. This makes it
impossible to capture the contingent nature of certain paradoxical circumstances that
Kripke discusses, and his solution is to compress the hierarchy of truth predicates into
one, leaving gaps only as necessary.
Similarly, ramication is the ultimate restriction on propositional quantication:
within an order, nothing can quantify over that order. This makes it impossible to
capture the contingent nature of the present paradox: the fear and hope reported in
(5) and (6) are risky but not inherently paradoxical. Any restrictions on propositional
quantication that are motivated by paradoxes like the complex Epimenides ought to
be similarly responsive to the facts; we should not block (9) and (10) from quantifying
over each others' denotations except when we must to avoid contradictions|when
(5){(8) are true.
The present idea is to compress the orders as much as possible, forcing propositions
up the hierarchy only when leaving them lower in it leads to contradictions.14 We
still insist that quantiers be restricted to particular orders, but allow the contents
of the orders to be contingent and variable, with each proposition appearing (with
a few exceptions explained below) in the lowest order it can. Most propositions will
thus be of order 0, the lowest possible order. This includes propositions that involve
propositional quantication, such as the proposition that every proposition of order
14This is not quite analogous to Kripke's approach, as he has only one truth predicate, while I
still have an innite hierarchy of orders. The true analogue is the special case of my proposal in
which we restrict ourselves to quantication over order 0 and ignore (or even eliminate) all other
orders.
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17 is self-identical. It also includes [[(90)]] and [[(100)]] whenever at least one of (5){(8)
is false.
Speaking very loosely about propositions and quantication, here is one way to
think about these orders: in a standard ramied hierarchy, if a proposition x is in
a higher order, it means both (i) that x can quantify over more propositions and
(ii) that fewer propositions can quantify over x. In compressed ramication, only the
second is retained. The domains x can quantify over are no longer tied to x's own
order; x being in order 0 means only that every proposition can unproblematically
quantify over x.
Even when (5){(8) are true, compressed ramication will usually disagree with
traditional ramication. According to the latter, [[(90)]] is of order n + 1 and [[(100)]]
is of order m+ 1. But this is not actually necessary to resolve the paradoxes. Recall
how ramication avoided the paradox when n > m: [[(90)]] could not be in the domain
of the quantier in (100), and so we could not carry the argument out all the way.
But this only requires that [[(90)]] be of order m + 1, not n + 1. More generally,
irrespective of the relationship between n and m, to resolve this paradox we need
to require only that [[(90)]] and [[(100)]] both be of order min(n;m) + 1; this is what
compressed ramication ensures.
Actually, there are other ways we can avoid this paradox with compressed orders;
this is why I had to qualify my above gloss of the compressed orders as making each
proposition appear \in the lowest order it can." The derivation of a contradiction
will be blocked as long as one of [[(90)]] and [[(100)]] is kept out of the range of the
other sentence's quantier, so any of the three following options will work (along
with innitely many uninteresting others).
(i) [[(90)]] and [[(100)]] are both of order min(n;m) + 1.
(ii) [[(90)]] is of order 0 and [[(100)]] is of order n+ 1.
(iii) [[(90)]] is of order m+ 1 and [[(100)]] is of order 0.
Of these three, I think (i) is clearly the best option. After all, (90) and (100) are
perfectly symmetrical; it would be strange if our resolution allowed us to treat [[(90)]]
and [[(100)]] dierently.
Still, we must be cautious because of paradoxes like the complex Prior.
I am now thinking and thinking only that everything I am
thinking is false if and only if someone else bears a propositional
attitude towards something at some time in the future.
(11)
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You said that snow is black. (12)
Everything I was then thinking is false if and only if
someone else bore a propositional attitude towards something.
(13)
Snow is black. (14)
In a ramied theory of types, we must replace (13) with (130). (Again, I suppress the
replacement for (11), assuming that the quantier in the rst \only" ranges over an
order higher than n and m.)
Everything of order n I was then thinking is false if and only if
someone else bore a propositional attitude towards something of order m.
(130)
We have a contradiction as long as [[(130)]] is of order n or less and [[(14)]] is of order
m or less. Thus, as before, we can avoid the paradox in any of three ways:
(iv) [[(130)]] and [[(14)]] are both of order min(n;m) + 1,
(v) [[(130)]] is of order 0 and [[(14)]] is of order n+ 1, and
(vi) [[(130)]] is of order m+ 1 and [[(14)]] is of order 0.
Here, though, I think (vi) is the clear favorite: making the object of my thought be
order n+1 is preferable to making the object of your speech|and indeed the objects
of every attitude every other person has had for the past three years|be order m+1.
Getting these results|respecting the symmetry in the complex Epimenides case
and the asymmetry in the complex Prior case|is, I think, crucial for any satisfactory
renement of ramication. This is why we cannot do something simple, like beginning
with the ramied orders and then pushing every proposition down as far as it can go
(that process would, it seems, select (iii) when n > m, and could perform similarly
badly if (14) contained a quantier). And it is why Sections 5.3 and 5.4 take a detour
through truth-value gaps.
3.2.3 Two domains
A dierent version of the quantier domain restriction approach, which I briey
develop in Chapter 5, is to return to the unramied theory, and to say that there
are only two domains of quantication. The main domain, which contains every
proposition, is the domain that most quantiers range over. Only quantiers in
problematic propositions, such as [[(9)]] when (5){(8) are true, are restricted, and
then they are restricted to quantifying over only the unproblematic propositions. In
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a way, this approach is more conservative than compressed ramication, because it
leaves the vast majority of propositions completely untouched. But it does not have
even the ad hoc machinery of orders to explain why, for instance, the quantier in (9)
suddenly ceases to range over [[(9)]] and [[(10)]] when (5){(8) are true. These issues
only compound the questions raised at the end of Section 3.2.1.
3.2.4 The proposition Liar paradox
The quantier domain restriction approach has nothing to say about the propo-
sition Liar paradox, as there are no quantiers involved in imagining a proposition
that is identical to its own negation. (Again, intensional forms of Yablo's paradox can
be similar|while they must involve quantiers, they need not involve propositional
quantiers, as I show in Section 5.3.3.) Unfortunately, this is one place where I think
that a proponent of a quantier domain restriction approach must appeal to a theory
of propositions, and insist that such a proposition is not possible. If we allow such
a proposition, then we must have some other resolution of the paradox, such as a
truth-value gap resolution, and it is likely that any such resolution will be resolve
all the intensional paradoxes while leaving the domains of quantication untouched,
obviating the need for the domain restriction approach in the rst place.
Perhaps this is not such a large price to pay. Certainly Russell would not have
been pleased with an inherently circular proposition like the one in the proposition
Liar, and most contemporary theories of propositions, structured or otherwise, also
prohibit it. The Yablo propositions are less straightforward, but the sequence itself is
still circularly dened, and plausibly viciously so.15 One might hope to nd grounds
for prohibiting viciously circular denitions without prohibiting circular quantication
that is merely potentially vicious, so as to retain the quantier domain restriction
approach to the contingent paradoxes while ruling out the necessary ones from the
start.
Still, I am not convinced that this is the right approach to take to the proposition
Liar and Yablo paradoxes. My purpose in this subsection is merely to argue out that
we cannot be silent on the nature of propositions forever, if we want to embrace a
domain-restriction resolution.
15Not all circularity is vicious, however|see, e.g., [Ant00]|and I do not pretend to have a good
test.
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3.3 Restrictions on attitudes
Arthur Prior's answer to the paradoxes is to say that sometimes people cannot
bear certain propositional attitudes to certain propositions, despite our intuitions oth-
erwise. That is, Prior says that what people can say, think, assert, fear, etc. depends
in part on matters of fact. In one important sense, this is the least radical approach
of them all, because it says absolutely nothing about propositions themselves, and
it embraces the derivations in Chapter 2: for Prior, (5){(8) really are inconsistent.
Thus, where the other approaches are forced to look for aws in the reasoning in the
proofs that led to the contradictions, Prior needs only to explain why our intuitions
about the consistency of the paradoxical assumptions are incorrect.
Unfortunately, Prior's approach is in other respects quite radical indeed. He
writes,
How, we all want to cry out, can what a man is thinking and even what
a man can be thinking on a given occasion, depend on what number is
written on the other side of a door? [Pri61, p. 30].16
But he is quite explicit about his position on these paradoxes:
At this point I must confess that all I can say to allay the misgivings
expressed in the past four sections is that so far as I have been able to
nd out, my terms are the best at present oering. I have been driven to
my conclusion very unwillingly, and have as it were wrested from Logic
the very most that I can for myself and others who feel as I do. So far as I
can see, we must just accept the fact that thinking, fearing, etc., because
they are attitudes in which we put ourselves in relation to the real world,
must from time to time be oddly blocked by factors in that world, and we
must just let Logic teach us where these blockages will be encountered.
[Pri61, p. 32]
The position, then, is that the connection between mental states and propositions
can sometimes fail, and that such failures can depend on just about anything. How
these failures occur is entirely obscure, but this obscurity is probably necessary in the
absence of a satisfactory theory from the philosophy of mind of how the connection
succeeds in non-paradoxical cases, and at any rate seems similar to obscurity about
the bases of truth-value gaps and restricted domains of propositional quantication.
One strange (but non-fatal, I think) consequence of this approach is that even
attempts to think, fear, etc. must sometimes be blocked: if, for instance, everything
16Here, Prior is referring to a paradox in which Mr. X thinks in Room 7 at 6 o'clock that
everything thought in Room 7 at 6 o'clock is false, thinks nothing else, and is the only person in the
room at that time.
21
else a Cretan tries to say is false, then Prior must claim that Epimenides cannot try
to say that everything a Cretan tries to say is false. Similarly, we cannot describe all
paradoxical circumstances in terms of what would usually happen. It may be true
in the complex Epimenides paradox, for instance, that although I do not fear that
everything you hope is false, I am nevertheless in a fear-like mental state that would
in most circumstances relate me to that proposition. But talk about such mental
states will not always work: I cannot be in that mental state if you hope that every
proposition to which I would be related in most circumstances in virtue of my fear-like
mental states is true (so long as every other proposition to which I am related in that
way is true).
Indeed, sometimes I cannot even act as though I have a certain fear, if you hope
something about the propositions that I act as though I fear; sometimes Epimenides
cannot even say words that would in normal circumstances express a certain propo-
sition. Of course Prior is not committed to saying that I cannot perform actions or
that Epimenides cannot utter words, but he is, I think, committed to saying that
sometimes, certain actions are not even what we would normally do if we had cer-
tain attitudes, and certain words are not even such that they would normally express
certain propositions. This last consideration about words not even normally express-
ing propositions might be especially worrying, because it seems to involve semantics
rather than mental attitudes, but I think it is just another version of the expression
Liar paradox, which I discuss at the end of this section.
Perhaps we can swallow these consequences. Prior, at any rate, seemed to be able
to, and the approach does still allow us to retain whatever theory of propositions
we want. But now we need to know which of (5){(8) is false, and Prior seems to
think that it depends on the order in which you and I attempt to have the relevant
attitudes. Consider another case that Prior discusses, the idea for which he attributes
to Jean Buridan:
Suppose there are four people who on a certain occasion say one thing
each. A says that 1 and 1 are 2|a truth. B says that 2 and 2 are 4|a
truth. C says that 2 and 2 are 5|a falsehood. And D says that exactly
as many truths as falsehoods are uttered on this occasion. [Pri61, p. 20]
As with the other paradoxes, we can prove that what D has said is both true and false.
Prior says that in the situation described by the rst four sentences of this passage,
the fth and nal sentence simply cannot be true|D simply cannot say that exactly
as many truths as falsehoods are uttered on this occasion. Similarly, concerning the
paradox involving Tarski that began Section 2.2, Prior writes,
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[S]ince snow is white, Tarski cannot say that snow is white . . . if he
says nothing else immediately after I have said that either what I am then
saying or what he will say immediately after, but not both of these things,
is false. . . . [Pri61, p. 29]
In both of these cases Prior seems to rely on a rst-come, rst-served principle: D
cannot say what she tried to say because A, B, and C got there rst; Tarski cannot
say that snow is white because Prior got there rst. The problem with this should be
abundantly clear in light of the complex Prior paradox: Prior is committed to saying
that for the past few years I have been the only thinking, hoping, fearing, asserting,
knowing, etc. being (unless somebody beat me to the punch!), and surely this is about
as unacceptable a result as one could ask for from a resolution of these paradoxes.
In Section 5.5, I propose to use truth-value gaps, as I do for the quantier domain
restriction resolutions, to identify the attitudes that must be blocked, so that, for
instance, (11) is false once (12) (or something similar) is true. Even this is not
perfect, though, as one is left to wonder what happens in the interim: Do I succeed in
thinking [[(13)]] until you say [[(14)]] and then suddenly cease to have thought it? That
will not do without some elaboration, since we will otherwise be able to construct
new paradoxes in which I think about it being true at a particular time that I thought
something or other. But it is also strange to say that it is never true that I thought
[[(13)]], since before anybody else bore an attitude to anything, there was no paradox.
Perhaps if determinism is true, whether a thought succeeds or fails could depend on
how things will turn out, but if determinism is false, even that will not work.
Once more, I want to set these questions aside until Section 7.3. Before leaving
our three approaches to the paradoxes, though, we should consider how Prior can
handle the expression Liar. The proposition Liar is, of course, out of his reach,
because it involves no propositional attitudes, and I suspect that any proponent of this
sort of resolution will have to follow the domain-restriction theorists in prohibiting
propositions that are necessarily viciously circular. But there are no propositional
attitudes involved in the expression Liar either. Still, insofar as attitudes can be
blocked because they put ourselves in relation to the rest world, perhaps meaning (and
even meaning-in-normal-circumstances, as discussed above) can be blocked because
it puts language in relation to the rest of the world. If so, then Prior can handle the
expression Liar paradox as well as he can handle the complex Prior and Epimenides
paradoxes.
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CHAPTER 4
Logic
I use a slightly simplied form of Church's Russellian Simple Type Theory [Chu74].
It is an intensional logic in the loose sense that the formulas we are ultimately in-
terested in are of a type p of propositions rather than a type t of truth values: I
translate every English sentence with a formula of type p, but I also translate ex-
plicit references to propositions, such as that-clauses, with formulas of type p. The
same formulas can thus appear both as arguments to connectives and as arguments
to predicates representing propositional attitudes. For instance, I translate (9) and
(10) as
8x[Hx! :x] and (16)
8x[Fx! x] (17)
respectively.
One could, following [Tho80], use dierent symbols for this logic, such as ;
alongside!. This would be especially helpful if one wished to include an extensional
logic along with the intensional part|if one wished to have both a type p and a type t.
Since I need only an intensional logic, though, I do not bother with such a notational
distinction; following Church, I use the familiar symbols with the understanding that
they do not have their familiar truth-functional interpretations.
One consequence of this is that some of the constructions involving truth values
are slightly long-winded. Notions of satisfaction and consistency, for instance, must
derive from restrictions placed on T and F , the sets of true and false propositions in
the models.
Finally, the logic I use does not include an explicit truth or falsity predicate. I
thus make no distinction between, e.g., the proposition that snow is white and the
proposition that the proposition that snow is white is true|I used the bare `x' in
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(16) and (17) rather than something like `Tx'. This treatment of truth is not novel:
it is the one Arthur Prior uses [Pri61] and it has been defended as the appropriate
treatment of (at least many instances of) the English `true' [GCB74]. But I think that
my decision to translate English sentences in this way is not a substantial one; the
constructions in Chapter 5 should work just as well with an explicit truth predicate.
4.1 Language
The set TS of type symbols of our language L is the smallest set such that p 2 TS
and for all ;  2 TS, h; i 2 TS. Intuitively, p is the type of propositions, hp; pi
is the type of functions from propositions to propositions, and so on.17 The proper
symbols are the constants :hp;pi, ^hp;hp;pii, _hp;hp;pii,!hp;hp;pii,$hp;hp;pii; for each  2 TS,
the constants =h;h;pii and an innite alphabet of variables x, y, etc.; and several
additional constants with superscript  2 TS that I introduce as needed to formalize
the paradoxes. The improper symbols are 8, 9, [, and ].18 I omit superscripts when
no ambiguity thereby arises.
Any proper symbol with superscript  is a well-formed formula of type  . If P is a
well-formed formula of type h; i and Q is a well-formed formula of type  , then PQ
(often written P(Q)) is a well-formed formula of type . If P is a well-formed formula
of type p and x is a variable, 8x[P] and 9x[P] are well-formed formulas of type p.  is
the set of well-formed formulas of L. I employ standard abbreviations, using P(Q;R)
for Ph;h;iiQR and P C Q for C(P;Q) when C is a binary connective or relation
symbol. I sometimes insert brackets to disambiguate scope; such disambiguations are
necessary only because of my abbreviations. When I omit brackets and parentheses,
I assume that juxtaposition has the narrowest scope possible, followed by relation
symbols like =. Thus, for instance, given constants ahp;pi, bp, and cp we should read
ab = ac ^ c as [a(b) = a(c)] ^ c, not something like a b = a(c ^ c).
I have already used `P', `Q', etc. as metavariables over well-formed formulas and
`x' as a metavariable over variables, and I continue to do so, sometimes with super-
scripts to restrict their ranges. Also as I already have, I allow symbols and formulas
17One could, of course, easily include other types, such as a type i of individuals, but we will not
need them.
18One could make L more general by including  as an improper symbol and replacing 8 and 9
with, for each  2 TS, constants 8hh;pi;pi and 9hh;pi;pi. But we will not need -abstraction, so I omit
it for simplicity's sake. I have taken both quantiers and all the connectives as primitive, rather
than dening some in terms of others, because we are dealing with propositions, not truth values.
I do not want to assume that, for instance, conjunctive propositions are identical to negations of
certain disjunctive ones, although I do not rule out such identities.
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to name themselves, omitting corner quotes. But I avoid using formulas to name their
denotations; I speak of not the proposition P ^ Q but the proposition denoted by
P^Q or the proposition [[P^Q]], where [[ ]] is the interpretation function introduced
in Section 4.2.
4.2 Models
A model M is a quadruple hD; T ;F ; [[ ]]i where
 D is a set of sets (domains) D , one for each  2 TS;
 T and F are disjoint subsets of Dp, whose purpose I explain below; and
 [[ ]] is an interpretation function, a function  ! SD (, recall, is the set of
well-formed formulas of our language L) taking each well-formed formula P to
an element of D .
When f is a partial function Dp * f0; 1g, I sometimes write `Mf ' for a model in
which T = fx 2 Dp : f(x) = 1g and F = fx 2 Dp : f(x) = 0g. (I use `x', `y', etc.
throughout as variables over elements of
S
D.)
As I have said, I make no assumptions about the nature of propositions; this
translates into placing no restrictions on Dp. The other D , as well as [[ ]], are entirely
standard. For any h; i 2 TS, Dh;i = DD, the set of functions from D to
D. When P is a lone proper symbol, [[P]] is unrestricted. When P has the form
8x[Q] or 9x[Q], [[P]] is mostly unrestricted: we need to ensure only that identity
is preserved under change of bound variables and substitution of identicals, so that,
e.g., we have [[8x[Ax]]] = [[8y[By]]] if we also have [[A]] = [[B]]. I discuss one way to
achieve this in Section 5.1. Of course, we must have [[P(Q)]] = [[P]]([[Q]]); [[ ]] is thus
entirely determined by its (mostly arbitrary) values for proper symbols and quantied
formulas.
T and F can be thought of as containing the true and false propositions respec-
tively. In assuming that T and F are disjoint, I assume that there are no truth-
value gluts; this requirement could be relaxed if one wanted to pursue paraconsistent
resolutions. In not requiring T and F to jointly exhaust Dp, I allow truth-value
gaps. I do however require that identity propositions never be gappy and always
have the correct truth values|I require that for any  2 TS and x;y 2 D we have
[[=h;h;pii]](x)(y) 2 T if x = y and [[=h;h;pii]](x)(y) 2 F otherwise. This requirement
does not conict with any of the resolutions I develop, because I am not considering
resolutions that involve making propositional identities contingent. It is slightly risky,
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because we invite unresolved paradoxes every time we prohibit truth-value gaps, but
I have not discovered any paradoxes that rely on propositional identities being always
determinate.
Finally, we must place some restrictions on our models to ensure that our truth
values and truth-value gaps are well-behaved. As explained in Section 3.1, I use
the strong Kleene scheme (extended to quantication following [Kri75]). In fact, I
require only that T and F follow one direction of the strong Kleene scheme; the other
direction will be established during the construction of the intended models. Thus, I
insist only that if a conjunction is in T , then both conjuncts must be in T , and if it
is in F , then one of the conjuncts must be in F ; that if a universal quantication is
in T , then every instance must be in T , and if it is in F , then an instance must be
in F ; and so on. Since this goes in only one direction, it does not require that, e.g.,
a conjunction be in T if both its conjuncts are.
We can state this restriction explicitly but much more tediously as follows. For
any variable x and z 2 D , let [[ ]]x=z be that interpretation function just like [[ ]]
except that [[x]]x=z = z.19 Then for all x;y 2 Dp, I require that
(a) if [[:]](x) 2 T , then x 2 F ;
(b) if [[:]](x) 2 F , then x 2 T ;
(c) if [[_]](x)(y) 2 T , then x 2 T or y 2 T ;
(d) if [[_]](x)(y) 2 F , then x;y 2 F ;
(e) if [[^]](x)(y) 2 T , then x;y 2 T ;
(f) if [[^]](x)(y) 2 F , then x 2 F or y 2 F ;
(g) if [[!]](x)(y) 2 T , then x 2 F or y 2 T ;
(h) if [[!]](x)(y) 2 F , then x 2 T and y 2 F ;
(i) if [[$]](x)(y) 2 T , then x;y 2 T or x;y 2 F ;
(j) if [[$]](x)(y) 2 F , then either x 2 T and y 2 F or x 2 F and y 2 T ;
(k) if [[8x [P]]] 2 T , then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 D ;
(l) if [[8x [P]]] 2 F , then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 D ;
(m) if [[9x [P]]] 2 T , then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 D ; and
(n) if [[9x [P]]] 2 F , then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 D .
19We are sure to have a unique such function because an interpretation function is entirely
determined by the arbitrary values it assigns to the proper symbols and quanticational formulas.
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4.3 Formalizing the paradoxes
4.3.1 The complex Epimenides paradox
At this point, we have the resources to reconstruct the paradoxes in our system.
We can capture the essence of (5){(8) with (18) and (19), letting (7) and (8) be
vacuously satised. (16) and (17) are reproduced from above (with a change in
variable).
8y[Hy ! :y] (16)
8y[Fy ! y] (17)
8xFx $ x = 8y[Hy ! :y] (18)
8xHx $ x = 8y[Fy ! y] (19)
The paradox is that if we suppose [[(18)]]; [[(19)]] 2 T and eliminate truth-value gaps,
requiring T [ F = Dp, then we can prove that [[(16)]] and [[(17)]] are in both T and
F . Given that T and F must be disjoint, this amounts to saying that there are no
gapless models with [[(18)]]; [[(19)]] 2 T .
The proof parallels the informal derivation in Section 2.1. Given [[(18)]]; [[(19)]] 2
T , suppose [[(16)]] 2 T . Then by clauses (k), (g), and (b) of the restriction above, we
know that for all z 2 Dp, if [[H]](z) 2 T , then z 2 F . Since [[(19)]] 2 T , we know by
clauses (k) and (i) and our insistence that identity statements be well-behaved that
we have [[H]]([[(17)]]) 2 T , and so we have [[(17)]] 2 F . By clauses (l) and (h), we
thus know that for some z 2 Dp we have [[F ]](z) 2 T and z 2 F . Since [[(18)]] 2 T ,
we know by clauses (k) and (i) and the well-behavedness of identity that [[(16)]] is
the only z 2 Dp for which we have [[F ]](z) 2 T , and so we have [[(16)]] 2 F , which
contradicts our initial supposition, given that T and F are disjoint.
[[(16)]], then, cannot be in T , and so must be in F if we do not allow truth-value
gaps. But from here, by similar reasoning, we can prove that it is in T , contra the
disjointness of T and F but this time with no suppositions.
Truth-value gaps, of course, block this proof by prohibiting the inference from
[[(16)]] =2 T to [[(16)]] 2 F . Ramication blocks the proof by restricting clauses (k){
(n), as we see in Section 5.3.
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4.3.2 The other paradoxes
As before, I omit the derivations of contradictions for the remaining paradoxes
because they parallel the proof for the complex Epimenides.
Replacing \someone else bears a propositional attitude towards" with \you say"
in (11), we can roughly capture (11){(14) with (20){(23) respectively.
8x
h
Tx $ x = 8y[Ty ! :y] $ :9y[Sy]i (20)
Ss (21)
8y[Ty ! :y] $ :9y[Sy] (22)
s (23)
Then the trouble is that when we have [[(20)]]; [[(21)]] 2 T and T [ F = Dp we can
prove both [[(22)]] 2 T and [[(22)]] 2 F .
As I have said, I set the expression Liar aside until Section 7.1.
The proposition Liar is perhaps the simplest to capture with our logic: we simply
introduce one more constant ap and assume [[(24)]] 2 T .
a = :a (24)
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CHAPTER 5
Four resolutions
5.1 A toy theory of propositions
In Section 4.2, I said that we were assuming that denotations were conserved
under change of variables and substitution of identicals. To prove the results in the
remainder of this chapter, we need to also ensure that we do not have any bizarre
identities, such as [[(18)]] = [[a]], which would make it impossible to get the complex
Epimenides o the ground.
One simple way to satisfy these assumptions is to prohibit nearly all propositional
identities. (I discuss a way to substantially relax this in Section 5.6.) As an illus-
tration, we can take our cue from Anderson's models of Church's Logic of Sense and
Denotation [And80].20 Let Dp be the set of equivalence classes of closed formulas of
type p for a particular equivalence relation R.21 For the most restrictive account of
identity that is of interest for our purposes, R is (the reexive, transitive closure of)
the relation that holds between all and only (i) formulas that vary only in their bound
variables (suitably and familiarly restricted to avoid relating problematic pairs like
8xx = 8y[x = y] and 8yy = 8y[y = y]); (ii) formulas P and P0 where (a) P0 is
the result of replacing a part Q of P with R and (b) either R(Q;R) or R(R;Q); and
(iii) a and :a. Our predicates then denote functions from sets of formulas to sets of
formulas. [[F ]], for instance, is the function that takes a set of formulas and returns
the set of formulas constructed by prepending F to the elements of the argument.
That is (momentarily insisting on corner quotes and recalling that ocially there are
20Though its spirit is similar, there are dierences between my construction and Anderson's. He
prohibits circular synonymies, while I do not, and my construction is simpler, as I am not trying to
capture a Fregean theory of sense and denotation. At the same time, though, my construction is
much more fragile, as I explain in note 22.
21I have not dened `closed', but the familiar denition suces. Of course I do not mean to
suggest that propositions are actually sets of formulas of L.
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no parentheses in L), for a set of formulas x, [[F ]](x) = fpFPq : P 2 xg.22
5.2 Truth-value gaps
Call a model M0 an extension of a model M i D = D0, [[ ]] = [[ ]]0, T  T 0,
and F  F 0, and call an extension M0 of M proper i either T  T 0 or F  F 0.
Recalling from Section 4.2 that Mf is a model in which T and F are dened by a
partial function f , Mg is then a proper extension of Mf i Df = Dg, [[ ]]f = [[ ]]g,
and f  g. Call Mf maximal i it has no proper extensions|i for any g  f , Mg
would violate one of clauses (a){(n) above. In eect, a model is maximal i no more
propositions can be made true or false without violating our restrictions on truth-
value assignments. According to a truth-value gap resolution, each maximal model
wholly determines one possible way the world can be.
That maximal models exist, if any models do, is almost immediate. (This should
not be a surprise, as they are closely analogous to maximal consistent sets of sen-
tences.) Let F be a set of partial functions f : Dp * f0; 1g such that for all f 2 F ,
Mf is a model. It suces to show that if F is totally ordered by  (which guarantees
that
S
F is a function), then M[F , abbreviated MF , is also a model|also treats
truth values as clauses (a){(n) require.
This is straightforward. Suppose, for instance, that for some x;y 2 Dp we have
[[^]](x)(y) 2 TF . We need to show x;y 2 TF in order to show thatMF satises clause
(e). But we have this: if [[^]](x)(y) 2 TF , then for some f 2 F we have [[^]](x)(y) 2 Tf ,
whence, since Mf satises clause (e) by supposition, we have x;y 2 Tf , whence we
have x;y 2 TF immediately. Every other case proceeds in exactly the same fashion:
if something is in TF or FF , then it is in some Tf or Ff respectively, whence whatever
the relevant clauses require of MF holds of Mf , whence it holds of MF as well.
Knowing that maximal models exist is a step in the right direction, but it does not
quite get us where we want to be. Ultimately, we need maximal models in which our
paradoxical assumptions are true|models in which [[(18)]]; [[(19)]]; [[(20)]]; [[(21)]] 2 T .
Truth values are preserved in extensions|taking extensions is monotonic|so this
amounts to needing just one such model, maximal or otherwise.
As I said above, we cannot in general be certain that there are models in which
[[(18)]]; [[(19)]]; [[(20)]]; [[(21)]] 2 T because we cannot in general be certain that we do
22Such a ne-grained treatment of propositions opens the door for a violation of Cantor's theorem
like the one in the Appendix B paradox: if we have a unique formula of type p for every x 2 Dhp;pi,
then this construction falls apart. But our current language L is safe, because it can express only
four of the (innitely many) elements of Dhp;pi|[[F ]], [[H]], [[T ]], and [[S]].
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not have bizarre propositional identities. But we can be certain of this given the
theory of propositions from Section 5.1. Working with that theory, all [[(18)]] 2 T
requires, for instance, is that propositions of the form [[F ]](x) be true or false. Of
course, clauses (a){(n) say nothing about propositions of this form, and so we can be
certain that there will be models with [[(18)]] 2 T|the model in which F is empty
and T = f[[F ]](x) : x 2 Dpg is one example. Similar considerations apply to the other
three paradoxical assumptions, and so we can be certain that there are maximal
models in which all four are true.
It remains to show that in such a model none of [[(16)]], [[(17)]], [[(22)]], and [[a]] will
have a truth value. But this follows immediately from the observations in Section
4.3.
5.3 Compressed ramication
The idea is to begin with a maximal, gappy model from the previous section; re-
strict the domain of quantication to just those propositions that have been assigned
truth values; and push the other propositions up to a higher order, where we can
(eventually) assign them truth values. The truth-value gaps disappear at the end
of the day, but along the way they help us get exactly the results, both symmetri-
cal and asymmetrical, described in Section 3.2.2. Consider, for instance, the desired
asymmetrical result for the complex Prior paradox|option (vi) from Section 3.2.2.
Nothing can stop [[s]] from having a truth value, given our toy model, because clauses
(a){(n) place no restrictions on it. Thus, [[s]] will always be in the domain of quan-
tication, and so the only way we will ever resolve the paradox is by keeping [[(22)]]
out of the domain until we are at a suciently high order.
To begin, we must enrich our language and models to make room for innitely
many domains of propositional quantication. Let I be a non-empty set of ordinals
with no greatest element. The natural numbers will do, although transnite orders
should pose no problems. The only change to our language is to replace each variable
xp with the variables xi, i 2 I. These new variables are treated as having superscript
p for syntactic purposes.
We now need to add orders to the variables in (16){(19), (20), and (22). In the
interest of not (further) overworking italic Latin letters, I use `', `', etc. as variables
over elements of I when we will need to refer to the orders later.
8y[Hy ! :y] (160)
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8y[Fy ! y] (170)
8xFx $ x = 8y[Hy ! :y] (180)
8xHx $ x = 8y[Fy ! y] (190)
8x
h
Tx $ x = 8y[Ty ! :y] $ :9y [Sy]i (200)
8y[Ty ! :y] $ :9y [Sy] (220)
(180) says that I fear (and fear only, through order ) that everything you hope of order
 is false (i.e., I fear [[(160)]]), and (190) says that you hope (and hope only, through
order ) that everything I fear of order  is true (i.e., you hope [[(170)]]). Similarly,
(200) says that I think (and think only, through order ) that everything of order 
is false i you do not say anything of order  (i.e., I think [[(220)]]. For simplicity,
suppose  <  <  <  and  <  < . The goal of compressed ramication is then
to have [[(160)]] and [[(170)]] in order +1, [[(220)]] in order +1, and [[s]] in order 0; ,
, , , and  can mostly drop out of the picture.
Notice in particular that I do not impose orders on arguments or outputs of
functions|[[F ]], for instance, can still take and return propositions of any order. This
is dierent from traditional ramication. But it is natural if one does not want to
assume in advance that propositions have particular orders.
The changes to the models are only slightly more involved. A model M is now a
quintuple hD;Q; T ;F ; [[ ]]i, where Q is a set of domains of propositional quantication
Qi, i 2 I.23 To make the Qi actually function as domains of quantication, we need
to change clauses (k){(n) of our restriction on T and F when the superscript  on x
is some i 2 I (when  =2 I, the original clauses suce).
(ki) If [[8xi[P]]] 2 T , then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 Qi;
(li) if [[8xi[P]]] 2 F , then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 Qi;
(mi) if [[9xi[P]]] 2 T , then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 Qi; and
(ni) if [[9xi[P]]] 2 F , then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 Qi.
5.3.1 First attempt
It is tempting to think that constructing the orders is almost trivial. Suppose
we have a maximal model M from Section 5.2. In eect, this is a model in which
23We need not require that we have Qi  Dp or [[xi]] 2 Qi. The former is covered by the
construction of the models, and the latter is not necessary: the order of a variable only matters
when it is bound, and then its initial value is unimportant.
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Qi = Dp for all i 2 I. Thus, we know we can assign truth values to the propositions
in T or F even when everything quanties over them, and so they can be in order 0
without trouble.
Why, then, can we not simply let T [ F be Q0? We could repeat the process for
all the subsequent orders: keeping our new Q0 xed, we simply nd another maximal
model, with orders 1 and up unrestricted; make the new T [ F our Q1; and so on.
The trouble is with the rst step. When we cut Q0 down to T [ F from Dp, we
cannot retain the original truth-value assignment. To see this, consider the propo-
sition [[9x[Fx]]]. When Q0 = Dp, we have [[9x[Fx]]] 2 T . That is, it is true that I
fear something. But when we move to Q0 = T [ F , this proposition must be false,
because the only thing I fear, [[(160)]], is now outside the domain of quantication.
This would not be troublesome on its own|we could simply adjust the truth-value
assignment and then move on to constructing Q1. But there may be propositions
that can be assigned truth values only when other propositions are in the domain of
quantication. That is, moving to Q0 = T [F might introduce new truth-value gaps.
We can see this by considering another paradox inspired by Prior. Prior's original
paradox was problematic only when snow was white. My thought was problematic
only in situations in which somebody else bore an attitude towards a proposition.
And indeed we can make a paradox contingent on any fact, such as whether I fear
something. More formally, consider the following two formulas. Glossing over the or-
ders, (26) says that the only A-proposition is the proposition that every A-proposition
is true i I fear something , and (25) denotes that proposition.
8y0 [Ay ! y] $ 9y0[Fy] (25)
8x0Ax $ x = 8y0 [Ay ! y] $ 9y0[Fy] (26)
Let a model Mf;Q be the model like Mf with Q0 = Q. With this notation, our
initial maximal, gappy model is Mf;Dp , and the model after we have cut Q0 down to
T [ F would be Mf;Dom(f), where Dom(f) is the domain of f . The trouble is that
Mf;Dom(f) is not guaranteed to be a model. If we have [[(26)]] 2 T , then [[(25)]] is truth
valueless whenever we have [[9y0[Fy]]] 2 F|whenever we have [[(160)]] =2 Q0. And we
have this inMf;Dom(f) so long as we have [[(18
0)]]; [[(190)]] 2 T|so long as the complex
Epimenides paradox gets o the ground. Thus, Mf;Dom(f) will not do if [[(26)]] 2 T ;
we must instead nd some maximal Mg;Dom(f), which does not assign a truth value
to [[(25)]]. This means we need to cut Q0 down further to Dom(g), so that it does not
include [[(25)]]. And, of course, once we have done so, we may need to cut it down
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still further due to other propositions, which were assigned truth values inMf;Dp and
Mg;Dom(f) but cannot be assigned truth values in any Mh;Dom(g). And so on.
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5.3.2 Second attempt
Luckily, following through on the \and so on" at the end of the last paragraph
can be monotonic in the sense that the domain of quantication never grows, and so
we can be guaranteed to have xed points that can serve as our order 0. We must,
however, change our approach slightly: Mf;Q must be the model likeMf with Qi = Q
for all i 2 I. The plan is thus to cut every domain down, opening the later ones back
up to Dp only after we have xed Q0.
To see why this is necessary, imagine that the superscript 0 in (25) and (26) were
a 1, and suppose that min( + )  1. This ensures that [[(26)]] 2 T is paradox-
ical during the construction of Q1, and so we must have [[(25)]] =2 Q1. Now, if we
were not cutting every subsequent order down while constructing Q0, we would have
[[9y1[Fy]]] 2 T during that construction, whence we would be able to assign a truth
value to [[(25)]], whence we would have [[(25)]] 2 Q0. But the orders are supposed to
be cumulative, so that is a contradiction. Ultimately, the idea behind this change is
that we cannot know in advance where a proposition will rst enter the hierarchy of
orders, and so if we discover that a proposition must be kept out of the order we are
constructing, the only safe approach (in light of these Prior-inspired paradoxes) is to
assume, for the duration of that construction, that it cannot be in any subsequent
order either.25
With that change made, call a model Mf;Q intermediate if Dom(f)  Q: inter-
mediate models are models in which every proposition that has a truth value is also
in the domain of quantication.26 The argument for the existence of maximal models
from Section 5.2 carries over without alteration: we can be certain that if there are
any intermediate models for some Q, then there is a maximal intermediate Mf;Q.
Now let G be a function on subsets of Dp which, given some set Q  Dp, returns
Dom(f), whereMf;Q is a maximal intermediate model (and returns ? if there are no
24There may also be propositions that can be assigned truth values only after the domain has
been cut down. If we prepend a : to 9y0[Fy] in (26) and (25), then [[(25)]] will be such a proposition
when [[(26)]] 2 T . In the interest of simplicity, I do not try to expand Q0 to include such propositions.
25Notice also that in light of this, truth values will change as the orders grow: for any i 2 I and
x 2 Qi+1 n Qi, we must have [[9y[y = x]]]x=x 2 F during the construction of Qi but 2 T during the
construction of Qi+1.
26I think that focusing on models of this sort is not necessary for avoiding the paradoxes, but it
is simplifying. It guarantees, for instance, that there is no expansion of the sort described in note
24.
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intermediate models at all with domain of quantication Q).27 Thus, for instance,
working with the f and g from the end of Section 5.3.1, we could have G(Dp) =
Dom(f) and G Dom(f) = Dom(g).
G is guaranteed to have xed points|we always have G(Q)  Q|but the most
common is bound to be ?. It thus remains to show that if we begin with Dp and
require only that we have [[(180)]]; [[(190)]]; [[(200)]]; [[(21)]] 2 T , then G will always return
a Q for which there are intermediate models. The challenge here is analogous to that
of showing that there are models with [[(18)]]; [[(19)]]; [[(20)]]; [[(21)]] 2 T in Section 5.2.
As with that case, we cannot guarantee that, given arbitrary true propositions (or
arbitrary propositional identities), G never returns ?. For instance, if we insist on
looking at models with [[9x[Ax]]] 2 T , then we will have G G(Dp) = ?. But also
as in Section 5.2, a simple examination of [[(180)]], [[(190)]], [[(200)]], and [[(21)]] should
put these fears to rest: these assumptions require only that certain propositions of
the form [[F ]](x), [[H]](x), [[T ]](x), and [[S]](x) be assigned particular truth values, and
truth-value assignments to such propositions are never jeopardized as the domain of
quantication shrinks, because (once again barring bizarre identities with the model
from Section 5.1) our clauses (a){(n) place no substantive restrictions on them.
The proposal is to use xed points of G, starting from G(Dp), for our orders. A
(non-empty) xed point of G is a domain of quantication Q such that there is a
maximal intermediate model Mf;Q with Dom(f) = Q. We can take such a Q as our
order 0|it is a set of propositions whose presence in every domain of quantication
never causes problems. Then we begin anew, working on order 1. The notation
quickly becomes unwieldy, but let Mf;Q;Q0 be a model with Q0 = Q and Qi = Q0 for
all i > 0. The idea is that, given our xed point Q from above, we start over with
a maximal Mf;Q;Dp , in which all the orders aside from 0 are again unrestricted. We
then cut each Qi, i > 0, down to Dom(f), and then to Dom(g) for some maximal
intermediate Mg;Q;Dom(f), and so on until we reach another xed point.28 That gives
us order 1. And then we do it again for every subsequent order, letting any transnite
order be the union of every lower order as usual.
As we proceed through the orders, we have progressively fewer truth-value gaps.
If the only paradoxical assumptions that we care about are (180), (190), (200), and
(21), then we could very well have orders min(; ) and lower be identical and orders
27It turns out that maximal models can disagree about the location of truth-value gaps|we can
have maximal models Mf;Q and Mg;Q with Dom(f) 6= Dom(g). Constructing a suitable G thus
requires the axiom of choice. Since we are ultimately interested in xed points, it is probably best
to always choose Q if possible.
28Technically, we need a new G, which holds order 0 xed and varies only subsequent orders.
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max(; )+1 and up be identical, so long as our truth-value assignment didn't happen
to make any other paradoxical assumptions true accidentally (recall that we assumed
 <  <  <  and  <  < ). In any event, as far as the complex Epimenides
paradox is concerned, as we build up through order , [[(160)]] and [[(170)]] will lack
truth values and thus be kept outside the orders. Once we hit +1, however, we will
be able to assign them both truth values without trouble: [[(160)]] can be vacuously
true, because [[(170)]] is the only proposition you hope (at least through order ) and
it cannot be in order . And then [[(170)]] can be true, because [[(160)]] is the only
proposition I fear (at least through order , and thus certainly through ) and we
just saw that it can true. Similarly, for the complex Prior, we will be able to assign
[[(220)]] a truth value only after we have constructed order .
5.3.3 The proposition Yablo paradox
I want to quickly make good on my promise in Section 2.6 that we can construct
the proposition Yablo paradox without propositional quantication by instead quan-
tifying over the (non-propositional) arguments to a propositional function. Add a
type o of ordinals, insisting that Do be non-empty and have no greatest element, and
a constant >ho;ho;pii, with accompanying restrictions on T and F to parallel those for
propositions of the form [[=]](x)(y).29 The paradox then comes from introducing a
constant Y ho;pi and requiring that for every x 2 Do, [[Y ]](x) = [[8y[y > x! :Y y]]]x=x.
That is, we have a problem so long as we have an innite hierarchy of propositions
[[Y ]](x), each of which says that [[Y ]](y) is false for every y greater than x.
With no propositional quantication to restrict, each [[Y ]](x) will forever lack a
truth value in the above construction (as well as in the construction in Section 5.4),
as will [[a]] from the proposition Liar. This reinforces my claim in Section 3.2.4 that
the best option for a quantier domain restriction approach is to prohibit things
like [[a]] and [[Y ]] from the outset: if we are willing to accept truth-value gaps in the
proposition Liar and Yablo paradoxes, we seem to have no reason to move beyond
Section 5.2 in the rst place.
5.4 Two domains
If we return to the unramied system, we can also avoid the paradoxes while lling
in all the truth-value gaps by beginning with a maximal, gappy M from Section 5.2;
29In light of our toy model, we must also add a unique name n for every element of Do to ensure
that we have enough propositions.
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setting Q = Dom(f); and then amending our clauses as follows.
(kalt) If [[8xp[P]]] 2 T and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 Dp;
(lalt) if [[8xp[P]]] 2 T but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 Q;
(malt) if [[8xp[P]]] 2 F and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 Dp;
(nalt) if [[8xp[P]]] 2 F but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 Q;
(oalt) if [[9xp[P]]] 2 T and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 Dp;
(palt) if [[9xp[P]]] 2 T but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 Q;
(qalt) if [[9xp[P]]] 2 F and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 Dp; and
(ralt) if [[9xp[P]]] 2 F but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 Q.
Now propositions within Q look at every proposition, but propositions outside Q care
about only those inside it. This obviates the need for the xed-point construction of
Section 5.3.2: we can skip directly from the maximal, gappyMf;Dp to a nal, gapless
(modulo the proposition Liar and Yablo paradoxes), restricted-quantication model
with Q = Dom(f). In this nal model, [[8x[Ax ! :x]]], for example, is vacuously
true, but our problematic [[b]] from above is still either true or false, because [[9x[Ax]]]
is in Q and is thus still unrestricted in its quantication.
5.5 Restrictions on attitudes
There is no way to be as systematic in this case as we have been with the previous
resolutions, because we are not here trying to develop models. Instead, we already
have the models; what we have to do is explain where our judgments about possibility
have gone wrong. That is, all we need is the ability to take a set of inconsistent
assumptions about propositional attitudes and identify the one that is false. Prior's
method was, again, to proceed chronologically through the attitudes, making as many
true as possible without backtracking.
Now that we have our truth-value gaps we can adopt a dierent method: begin
with the paradoxical assumptions, construct a gappy model, and block any attitudes
that have as their object a proposition that lacks a truth value in that model. For
each gappy model there will be one theory about which assumptions are false|
which propositional attitudes were blocked. In the complex Epimenides paradox, for
instance, both my fear and your hope will always be blocked, because neither receives
a truth value in any model. Likewise, in the complex Prior paradox, my thought will
always be blocked, but your speech never will be, because the proposition that snow
is black will always receive a truth value.
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This revision of Prior's resolution does not address all the problems. In particular,
it has nothing to say about the temporal concerns. But it does address what I think is
the most pressing problem with Prior's resolution: no longer can we preempt another's
propositional attitudes without some measure of cooperation.
5.6 Other theories of propositions
Using our toy model from Section 5.1, propositions are about as ne-grained as
they can be, but we can easily construct models at the other extreme, identifying
propositions (such as [[P]] and [[P ^ 8x[x = x]]]) whenever they necessarily have the
same truth value: given a particular resolution, add hP;Qi to R if for all models
M of that resolution we have [[P]] 2 T i [[Q]] 2 T and [[P]] 2 F i [[Q]] 2 F .
Unfortunately, we cannot interpret the old models with the new R, because even if
[[P]] and [[Q]] always have the same truth value, there is no guarantee that [[R(P)]]
and [[R(Q)]] will for arbitrary Rs. Thus we will have to repeat the process. But the
process is a monotonic function of R, and so it will reach a xed point, which will
be an R that holds among every pair of necessarily equivalent formulas|formulas
whose denotations are assigned the same truth values in every model.
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CHAPTER 6
The Appendix B paradox
I begin with a general version of the Appendix B paradox involving propositional
functions. Suppose that we have a constant mhhp;pi;pi for which the following is true.
8xhp;pi8yhp;pi[mx = my ! x = y] (27)
As with the original Appendix B paradox, such a supposition should be worrying,
because if it is correct, then there is a unique proposition for every function from
propositions to propositions, in violation of Cantor's theorem. Indeed, if we also
suppose
8xpwx $ 9y[x = my ^ :yx]; (28)
we can prove that [[w]]([[mw]]) is both true and false, assuming it must be one or the
other. Suppose that it is true|suppose [[w]]([[mw]]) 2 T . Then by (28) we know that
for some y, [[mw]] = [[m]](y) and y([[mw]]) 2 F . By the former and (27) we have
y = [[w]], whence by the latter we have [[w]]([[mw]]) 2 F , contra our assumption. Thus
[[w]]([[mw]]) must be false|we must have [[w]]([[mw]]) 2 F . Then by (28) we know
that for no y do we have both [[mw]] = [[m]](y) and y([[mw]]) 2 F . In particular, we
do not have those for y = [[w]]. Of course, [[mw]] = [[m]]([[w]]), so we must not have
[[w]]([[mw]]) 2 F , a contradiction.
Nevertheless, according to some intuitions, (27) seems plausible. If, for instance,
[[m]](x) is the proposition that x is my favorite function from propositions to proposi-
tions, it is dicult to see how (27) could be false|surely that proposition is unique to
x. One can then think of [[w]] as that function which is true of a proposition x (more
carefully: which returns a true proposition when given a proposition x) just in case
for some y, (i) x is the proposition that y is my favorite function from propositions
to propositions and (ii) y is not true of x|y(x) 2 F .
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If one can argue independently that one of (27) and (28) is false|if, for instance,
one's preferred theory of propositions ensures that (27) is false, as many do|then
of course the paradox dissolves. In fact, it is impossible to make (27) true given the
models I have been discussing; this is why I put o discussing this paradox until now.
The domains of those models are sets, and so Dhp;pi, which is the set of all functions
from Dp to itself, must be larger than Dp.30 But then it is not possible to have a
one-to-one function from Dhp;pi to Dp, as [[m]] must be according to (27). Nevertheless,
one can imagine more exible models which do not immediately make (27) false, and
it is instructive to study the paradox more carefully, if only because it highlights an
important dierence between uncompressed and compressed ramication. The other
resolutions of the Appendix B paradox are relatively straightforward.
6.1 Truth-value gaps
The construction from Section 5.2 immediately resolves this paradox by ensuring
that [[w]]([[mw]]) will never have a truth value because, as we have seen, any attempt
to assign it a truth value results in a contradiction.
6.2 Uncompressed ramication
Traditional ramication resolves this paradox by placing restrictions on quanti-
cation over propositional functions. One can think of the original implementation of
ramication as replacing every p in a type symbol with a numeral, as we did before
for the variables of type p. That is, for every function, we restrict both the possi-
ble arguments and the possible values to a particular order. Thus, for instance, for
; ;  2 I with   , (27) becomes
8xh;i8yh;i[mhh;i;ix = my ! x = y]: (270)
(We must have    so that the output of [[m]] can be an argument to its input|
so that w(mw) is well-formed. We do not need to have  =  because orders are
cumulative.)
We can dene the order of a function recursively as the sum of the orders of its
input and output. Thus, for instance, [[m]]31 is of order ++.32 It is then easiest to
30Here, I assume that there is more than one proposition|that jDpj  2.
31Here and throughout I depart slightly from Church: he uses comprehension schemas, rather
than talking directly about the denotations of formulas, but this shift is harmless for my purposes.
32This is not quite the way orders are dened in [Chu76]. There, functions of arbitrarily many
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see how the contradiction is blocked by introducing Church's comprehension schema,
which I have translated into the present system. For every Pp we are guaranteed to
have the following true, so long as z (does not appear in P and) is (i) of higher order
than every bound variable in P and (ii) of at least as high an order as every free
variable and constant in P [Chu76, p. 750].33
9z8x[zx $ P] (29)
We need the following in order to be certain we have the right sort of [[w]], and
thus to derive a contradiction from (270).
9zh;i
h
8xzx $ 9yh;i[x = my ^ :yx]i
However, this is not an instance of (29) for two reasons. First, z is of the same order
as y, in violation of clause (i) above. Second, z is of lower order than m, in violation
of clause (ii). (Here it is important that the lowest order in Church's system is 1.)
The only true instance is
9zh;i
h
8xzx $ 9yh;i[x = my ^ :yx]i (280)
for some    +  (and thus >, because, again, Church's lowest order is 1). Thus,
although we can be certain from (280) that there is a function very much like the [[w]]
that the paradox requires, there are two reasons that we cannot take it as [[w]] and
still prove that [[w(mw)]] is both true and false. First, [[w]] would then be outside the
domain of the quantiers in (270). Second, w(mw) would then be ill-formed because
mw would be ill-formed|w would be not the right type to appear as an argument
to m.
6.3 Compressed ramication
I think it is telling that in both crucial steps above, it was overdetermined that
the paradox could not go through. We had two reasons that [[w]] could not be of
type h; i, which gave us two reasons that [[w(mw)]] was not both true and false.
arguments are considered, so that we can have types like h1; 2;    ; n; i, and the order of such a
type is the sum of the order of  and the highest of the orders of 1{n. Luckily, we do not need to
address functions of more than one argument, so the simple denition in the text suces.
33The schema is actually more general, allowing for arbitrarily many free x in P, but we can
make do with the schema for a single x.
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Compressed ramication sets out to retain just the rst of each pair of reasons|to
retain the one reason in each case that involves quantication. Once we see that
those reasons are enough to resolve the paradox, we can greatly simplify our orders.
We no longer need to care about the orders of the inputs to a function: we can
look exclusively at the orders of its outputs, which can of course vary in a theory
of compressed ramied types. The story then remains that when we quantify over
propositional functions, we really quantify over only functions of a particular order.
The dierence is that the order of a function is now simply the highest of the orders
of its outputs.
6.3.1 Machinery
Recall that I is a set of indices, intuitively corresponding to our orders. Before,
when we restricted propositional quantication, we replaced every variable xp with
a collection of variables xi. Now we want to restrict quantication over functions
as well, so for every variable x, if the superscript on x ends in a p, we replace that
variable with a collection of variables on which that last p has been replaced with some
i 2 I. Thus, for instance, xhhp;pi;pi is replaced with a collection of variables xhhp;pi;ii,
yhp;hp;pii with yhp;hp;iii, and so on. is are still treated as ps for syntactic purposes; as
before, they play a role only in restrictions (k){(n) on truth-values assignments.
Intuitively, xhp;ii ranges over only functions all of whose outputs are of order i or
less. We can capture this more formally by dening a domain of quantication Q
for every  that is a variable superscript. It is easiest to recursively dene Q more
generally for every  that is either a type symbol or a variable superscript. We already
have Qi for i 2 I from our models. Let Qp = Dp, and then let Qh;i = QQ, where
QQ, recall, is the set of functions from Q to Q. Indices appear only at the ends
of variable superscripts, so this amounts to having Qh;i = QD. This makes Qh;i
the set of functions in Dh;iwhose ranges are subsets of Q, as intended.
Now we can return to nearly the original forms of the last four restrictions on
truth-value assignments, changing the Ds to Qs and, of course, widening the range
of  from TS to include all our new variable superscripts:
(k0) if [[8x [P]]] 2 T , then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 Q ;
(l0) if [[8x [P]]] 2 F , then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 Q ;
(m0) if [[9x [P]]] 2 T , then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 Q ; and
(n0) if [[9x [P]]] 2 F , then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 Q .
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An unintended consequence of this construction is that [[^]], [[:]], etc. never appear
in a domain of quantication unless we have a domain of universal propositional
quantication|unless for some i 2 I we have Qi = Dp. This is because they have
outputs of every order. This is not an ideal consequence, but I think that it is also
not fatal.
6.3.2 Resolution
At this point we have enough to explain how compressed orders resolve the para-
dox. In fact, the construction from Section 5.3 can go through unchanged as long as
we use our new (k0){(n0). Neither (27) nor (270) is a formula of our language; we must
instead have
8xhp;i8yhp;i[mhhp;pi;pix = my ! x = y] (2700)
for some  2 I. We must also rewrite (28). We can assume that there is a value
for w, rather than going through a comprehension schema, because our compressed
orders take care of the contradiction.
8xwhp;pix $ 9yhp;i[x = my ^ :yx] (2800)
To get the paradox o the ground, suppose that we have [[(2700)]]; [[(2800)]] 2 T .
For simplicity, I suppose that for all x 6= [[mw]], [[w]](x) can be assigned a truth value
unproblematically.34  matters only insofar as there is no paradox at all if we have
some reason to exclude [[mw]] from Q, so also suppose that we have [[mw]] 2 Q.35
In what follows, let `y' range over only those functions for which we have
y 6= [[w]] and [[mw]] = [[m]](y). Of course, there may very well be no such
y. Whether there is such a y can be determined before we begin constructing the
orders, as it is purely a matter of identities, and identities are xed from the outset.
First, notice that if we have [[w(mw)]] 2 T at an order  (more precisely, if we have
it during the construction of Q), then both [[w]] and some y such that y([[mw]]) 2 F
are in Qhp;i: [[w]] because of our simplifying assumption that every other proposition
of the form [[w]](x) has a truth value and such a y because we need a witness to
the right-hand side of (2800). Thus we cannot make [[w(mw)]] true at an order   
(again, more precisely, during the construction of Q,   ), on pain of contradiction
34This is entirely a simplifying assumption. I discuss it below.
35It is unlikely that this assumption will be false very often. Orders depend entirely on truth-value
assignments and there are no restrictions on the truth values of propositions of the form [[m]](x), so
we have no reason to expect that [[mw]] will ever be gappy, and thus no reason to expect to have
even [[mw]] =2 Q0, let alone [[mw]] =2 Q .
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from (2700) (recall the bold stipulation above).
Now, there are two exhaustive but not exclusive possibilities.
(i) If for some y we can consistently have y 2 Qhp;i and y([[mw]]) 2 F ,
then that y can witness the truth of the right-hand side of (2800). For this
y, there is a least 0   such that y 2 Qhp;0i,36 and we can have
[[w(mw)]] 2 T at order min(0;  + 1) but no earlier.37 That is, we have
models in which [[w(mw)]] 2 T and =2 Qmin(0;+1) 1 but 2 Qmin(0;+1). We need
to be at least as high as 0 to make sure that we have our witness, and we need
to be beyond order  for the reasons in the preceding paragraph.
(ii) If we can consistently have y([[mw]]) 2 T for every y 2 Qhp;i, then
we can have [[w(mw)]] 2 F at order  + 1 but no earlier. That is, we
have models in which [[w(mw)]] 2 F and =2 Q but 2 Q+1. This covers the
case in which there are no y|in which we do not have a y 6= [[w]] such that
[[mw]] = [[m]](y). We cannot make [[w(mw)]] false before order  + 1, given our
simplifying assumption, because then we would have [[w]] 2 Qhp;i, and [[w]] itself
would witness the truth of the right-hand side of (2800), contra the falsity of
[[w(mw)]].
If the antecedent of only (whence exactly, since they are exhaustive) one of (i) and
(ii) holds, then the corresponding consequent tells us what the models look like. If
both antecedents hold, then we have some of each type of model.38
If we do away with the simplifying assumption that [[w(mw)]] is the only proposi-
tion of the form [[w]](y) whose truth is problematic, then we add a further layer to our
cases: we could make [[w(mw)]] false earlier than order  + 1 if doing so didn't force
[[w]] into Qhp;i, and we could make [[w(mw)]] true earlier than order  + 1 if doing
so didn't force [[w]] into Qhp;i. But this only multiplies (in relatively uninteresting
directions) the ways we can resolve the paradox, so the only result of doing away with
this assumption would be more clauses in the already complex possibilities described
above; it really is playing only a simplifying role.
36If no y(x) is potentially paradoxical, then we should have 0 = 0, but we can harmlessly work
with the more general case.
37Barring bizarre identities as always.
38One might think that the possible models depend on how min(0; +1) and  compare: that if
min(0; +1)  +1, then we have models of the sort described in (i); if +1  min(0; +1), then
we have models of the sort described in (ii); and only if min(0;  + 1) =  + 1 do we have models
of both sorts. But this assumes that once a proposition has been assigned a truth value during the
construction of an order, it retains that truth value through the construction of each subsequent
order. This is not only not required, but actually guaranteed to be false as long as the orders grow
at all; see note 25. Thus, even if, for instance, both antecedents are true and min(0; +1) < +1,
we will eventually see models of both sorts, and we will be restricted to models of the rst sort only
until we have begun constructing order  + 1.
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6.3.3 Summary
This is a reiteration of the bold text above. Let `y' range over only those functions
for which we have y 6= [[w]] and [[mw]] = [[m]](y). If for some y we can consistently
have y 2 Qhp;i and y([[mw]]) 2 F , then there is a least 0   such that y 2 Qhp;0i,
and we can have [[w(mw)]] 2 T at order min(0;  + 1). If we can consistently have
y([[mw]]) 2 T for every y 2 Qhp;i, then we can have [[w(mw)]] 2 F at order  + 1.
6.4 Two domains
As before, the resolution is an adaptation of the idea behind compressed rami-
cation. Given a maximal, gappy modelM, let Qp be T [F and Qh;i be QD|the
latter ensures that a function is in Qh;i i all its outputs are in Q. Since [[w]]([[mw]])
lacks a truth value, it will not be in Qp, and so [[w]] will not be in Qhp;pi. This means
that with the following updated clauses we will have extended our two-domain res-
olution to propositional functions, and [[w]]([[mw]]) will be false. These clauses are a
bit strange, because they restrict quantiers over types other than p on the basis of
their appearing at the beginning of a formula of type p that lacks a truth-value, but
I have not been able to discover any new paradoxes that this introduces.
(kalt
0
) If [[8x [P]]] 2 T and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 D ;
(lalt
0
) if [[8x [P]]] 2 T but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for all z 2 Q ;
(malt
0
) if [[8x [P]]] 2 F and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 D ;
(nalt
0
) if [[8x [P]]] 2 F but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for some z 2 Q ;
(oalt
0
) if [[9x [P]]] 2 T and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 D ;
(palt
0
) if [[9x [P]]] 2 T but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 T for some z 2 Q ;
(qalt
0
) if [[9x [P]]] 2 F and Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 D ; and
(ralt
0
) if [[9x [P]]] 2 F but =2 Q, then [[P]]x=z 2 F for all z 2 Q .
To see that [[w]]([[mw]]) will be false, recall the assumption about w:
8xpwx $ 9y[x = my ^ :yx]: (28)
Given this assumption, as I said in Section 6.1, [[w]]([[mw]]) will lack a truth value.
This means that the right-hand side of the biconditional in (28) lacks a truth value
when [[x]] = [[mw]], because by (27), which ensures the uniqueness of [[m]](x) to x,
the only value of y for which [[9y[x = my ^ :yx]]] could be true is [[w]], and we
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already know that we do not have [[:w(mw)]]. Thus, when [[x]] = [[mw]], we have
[[9y[x = my ^ :yx]]] 2 Q, and so when we go to evaluate it in our new two-domain
theory (for instance when we are checking to see whether [[w]]([[mw]]) can be assigned
a truth value), we will ignore the variable assignment [[y]] = [[w]], because [[w]] =2 Qhp;pi.
Again by the uniqueness of [[m]](x) to x, this ensures that the left conjunct in 9y[x =
my ^ :yx] will never be true when [[x]] = [[mw]], and so [[w]]([[mw]]) will be false.
6.5 Variations
The goal of compressed ramication and the two-domain resolution is to retain
traditional ramication's ability to resolve the paradoxes while allowing for more
exible domains of quantication. I think their treatment of the above version of the
Appendix B paradox satises this goal. But there are other paradoxes that highlight
important dierences between uncompressed ramication on the one hand and these
two quantier domain restriction resolutions on the other. For simplicity, I talk about
compressed ramication, but all the following points apply equally to the two-domain
resolution. As usual, the truth-value gap approach resolves these paradoxes without
trouble.
6.5.1 The original Appendix B paradox
In the original version of the Appendix B paradox, [[m]](x) is the proposition that
every proposition of which x is true is true, i.e., the proposition [[8x[yx ! x]]]y=x.
With this interpretation, the problematical assumption is not (27) but
8xhp;pi8yhp;pi8z[xz ! z] = 8z[yz ! z] ! x = y: (30)
Since each [[m]](x) now involves propositional quantication, traditional ramica-
tion provides a dierent resolution of the paradox. This comes from Church's rst
comprehension schema [Chu76, p. 750]: for every P of type p we are guaranteed to
have the following true, so long as x (does not appear in P and) is (i) of higher order
than every bound variable in P and (ii) of at least as high an order as every free
variable and constant in P.
9x[x $ P] (31)
This comprehension schema ensures that [[8z[wz ! z]]] is of at least as high an
order as [[w]]. But then, since the order of [[w]] is the sum of the orders of its inputs
and outputs, [[8z[wz ! z]]] cannot be an argument to [[w]]. (Again, Church's lowest
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propositional order is 1.) It is thus wrong to even ask whether [[w(8z[wz ! z])]] is
true or false.
Compressed ramication does away with restrictions on the arguments to func-
tions, so it cannot provide this resolution. I think, however, that this is not a great
shortcoming. In the general case, when [[mw]] does not involve quantication, even
uncompressed ramication must fall back on restrictions on quantication over propo-
sitional functions; compressed ramication merely extends that reliance to the original
Appendix B paradox.
6.5.2 Sets, properties, pluralities, etc.
A greater shortcoming of compressed ramication is that it has no easy answer to
paradoxes that arise if we extend the logic to cover, for example, sets, properties, or
pluralities.
(i) For every set x, there seems to be the proposition m(x) that x is my favorite
set. But what about the set w of all and only propositions of the form m(x)
such that m(x) =2 x|do we have m(w) 2 w?
(ii) For every property x, there seems to be the proposition m(x) that x is my
favorite property . But what about the property w of being a proposition of the
form m(x) that does not have the property x|does m(w) have w?
(iii) For any propositions xx, there is the propositionm(xx) that xx are my favorites.
But what about those propositions ww that are of the form m(xx) but not one
of xx|is m(ww) one of ww?39
None of these paradoxes can be constructed in the system as it stands, but we can
imagine introducing, say, a type s of sets of propositions and a constant 2hp;hs;pii in
order to capture the paradox in (i).
It would be natural for traditional ramication to insist that each set be capped at
some order or other: this parallels the requirement that propositional functions take
input of only a certain order, and it blocks the paradox. But compressed ramication
does away with the requirement that such an insistence parallels|functions in a
theory of compressed ramied types can take inputs of any order|and so it cannot
block the paradox in the same manner. All compressed ramication allows is ordering
functions by the orders of their outputs. The parallel of this is ordering a set x by
the orders of propositions of the form [[P 2 x]]x=x|the orders of propositions about
39This paradox is the subject of [MR00].
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membership in x. This strikes me as a truly bizarre method of assigning orders to
sets.
Similar contortions are required in cases (ii) and (iii), and I think the story in
the case of plural quantication is even less plausible than it is in the cases of sets
and properties|surely pluralities should be ordered by the orders of their parts, and
not by the orders of propositions about being among them. These paradoxes, then,
show that while it might make some sense to determine the order of a function by
the orders of its outputs, this does not naturally extend to some of the purposes to
which functions are often put. For some purposes, for instance, we can use functions
in place of sets and a membership relation, but extending the orders from Section 6.3
to sets in order to block the paradox in (i) seems hopelessly ad hoc.
6.5.3 A return to the proposition Liar?
One response here is to insist on behalf of the quantier domain restriction ap-
proach that none of the paradoxes in this section (and perhaps even in this chapter)
can even get o the ground. I observed at the beginning of this chapter that (27)
cannot be true in the models we have been working with, and certainly it is plausible
for a theory of functions, sets, properties, or pluralities to prohibit having a unique
proposition for every function, set, property, or plurality of propositions. We have
already seen that these resolutions must appeal to a theory of propositions to block
the proposition Liar paradox; perhaps we can nd good independent reasons, coming
from our theories of functions, sets, etc., to block these paradoxes as well.
Of course, such a response leaves something to be desired: we still want an ex-
planation of where our intuitions have gone wrong. Why must there be two distinct
functions of type hp; pi x and y such that the proposition that x is my favorite func-
tion is identical to the proposition that y is my favorite function? What functions
are they? Why can't anyone even believe that one is my favorite without thereby
believing that the other is my favorite? Taking this route amounts to buying a sim-
ple theory of sets at the cost of intuitive stories about propositional identity and
dierentiation.
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CHAPTER 7
Comparing the resolutions
7.1 The expression Liar paradox
To capture the expression Liar, we must extend our language to be able to talk
about formulas and expression. This paradox, recall, involves the sentence
(15) does not express a true proposition. (15)
One easy way to make these extensions is to introduce a new primitive type symbol
f and a new constant Ehf;hp;pii. Intuitively, f is the type of formulas|Df is |and
[[E(P;Q)]] is the proposition that [[P]] expresses [[Q]]. As we did with =, we suppose
that [[E(P;Q)]] always has the correct truth value. That is, we suppose that we have
[[E(P;Q)]] 2 T i [[P]] is a formula that really does denote [[Q]] and [[E(P;Q)]] 2 F
otherwise. (As a consequence, [[E(P;Q)]] is always in either T or F|it is always
either true or false, and is never gappy.) We can put this somewhat awkwardly by
saying that we have [[E(P;Q)]] 2 T i [[[[P]]]] = [[Q]], since [[P]] is a formula that can
itself be interpreted by our interpretation function.
We also need a constant lf, which denotes the formula :9x[E(l; x)^x], which is a
rough translation of (15) into L. That is, `lf ' (momentarily dropping the convention of
allowing formulas to name themselves) denotes a formula of type p, whose denotation
in turn is the proposition that the formula denoted by `l' does not denote a true
proposition. Put yet another way, [[l]] is the translation of (15) into L. This amounts
to a restriction on [[ ]]: we must have [[l]] = :9x[E(l; x) ^ x] (reinstating our omission
of mention quotes).
We do not need anything further; these assumptions about [[ ]], T , and F allow
us to prove both [[:9x[E(l; x) ^ x]]] 2 T and [[:9x[E(l; x) ^ x]]] 2 F when we have
T [ F = Dp. As with the other intensional paradoxes, this is easily handled by
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the truth-value gap approach: [[:9x[E(l; x) ^ x]]] is simply neither true nor false,
as there is no way to assign it a truth value in any model, maximal or otherwise.
Thus, according to compressed ramication, it will be kept out of whatever order x
is restricted to; according to the two-domain theory, it will be kept out of Q and x
will be restricted to Q; and if we extend Prior's restriction on propositional attitudes
to expression, we will see that since [[:9x[E(l; x) ^ x]]] lacks a truth value, it must
be that our assumption that it is expressed by [[l]] is false (clearly, this approach will
require that we relax our assumption about [[E(P;Q)]] always having a truth value).
This is why I did not bother to address the paradox from the start|its formulation
requires complications, such as our new type f , and its resolution requires nothing
beyond the constructions in Chapter 5.
7.2 Strengthened paradoxes
One might be dissatised with this resolution of the expression Liar on the grounds
that it does violence to the intended meaning of (15)|on the grounds that the formula
denoted by l is a poor translation of the original English sentence. This is, after all,
a strengthened form of the expression Liar; at least according to one intuition, the
proposition expressed by (15) should be true if it is neither true nor false. Similarly,
if [[:9x[E(l; x) ^ x]]] is vacuously true, as it is according to every quantier domain
restriction resolution, then, quantier domains aside, it is intuitively clear that (15)
denotes a true proposition, and so that it (the sentence, and thus the proposition it
denotes) ought to be false.
It should not be surprising that strengthened forms of the paradoxes have in-
tuitively unsatisfactory resolutions; this problem is not limited to the resolutions I
have developed, and it is not limited to the intensional paradoxes. Most resolutions
of either type of paradox require some expressive limitation or other, whether it is
an inability to talk about truth-value gaps (be they gaps in T and F or gaps in
satisfaction) or an inability to talk about a domain of quantication of one form or
another. The situation semantics of [BE87], Glanzberg's contextualist machinery in
[Gla04], and Burge's contextualist suggestions in [Bur79, Bur84] can all, to some ex-
tent, address the worries posed by strengthened intensional paradoxes. The idea, very
roughly, is that when we start talking about the treatment of some paradox according
to some particular resolution, observing that the resolution seems to force us to say
something dierent about the paradoxical proposition or sentence, we move to a new
situation or context.
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What is important for my purposes is that all these approaches to the strengthened
paradoxes require an initial, non-contextualist resolution. Contextualism (or situation
semantics; for simplicity I use only contextualist examples) can explain the reasoning
at the beginning of this section by saying that we begin in a context in which (15)
either doesn't express a proposition in the domain of quantication (Glanzberg) or
expresses a proposition that lacks a truth value (Burge, roughly) and then move to
a context in which it expresses a proposition in the domain/expresses one that has
a truth value. But we still need to be able to identify the initial, pre-shift context,
in which (15) fails to denote a proposition/denotes a proposition that lacks a truth
value. This is what I have done in Sections 5.3 (and 5.4) and 5.2 respectively.
This is not to say that strengthened paradoxes have nothing to say about resolu-
tions at the general level at which I have been working. One of the reasons Glanzberg
favors his quantier domain restriction approach is that we have independent rea-
son to think that domains of quantication are context-sensitive, and that is cer-
tainly a benet of that approach over the truth-value gap approach. And there are
problems facing quantier domain restriction approaches that might be addressed
by turning to situations, as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and Willem Groeneveld
[BE87, Gro94] have. But we cannot be held hostage to pre-existing work: all the
context- or situation-based machinery in the world will not help if we cannot get a
satisfactory pre-shift, paradox-free context or situation o the ground. By working
at a very general level, I think we can identify (and have identied) problems and
choices that face at least the majority of resolutions, no matter how they incorporate
ideas from Glanzberg, Burge, etc.
I also do not mean to say that one can easily tack a theory of contexts or situations
onto the resolutions I have developed; it is not at all clear what one could rely on
in the logic I have been using to shift the context to one in which our problematic
paradoxes are assigned truth values/are within the domain of quantication,40 let
alone what those new contexts would look like. As I said in Section 3.2.1, there is
a real question about how domains of quantication can vary with the context. If
we want to take a contextualist approach to the strengthened paradoxes, this issue
arises again with more force, and applies equally to truth-value gap approaches: what
triggers the context shift in the reasoning at the beginning of this section? Any
complete resolution of the paradoxes must have an answer.
40Perhaps this is a reason to introduce explicit truth predicates, contra [GCB74]. As I said at
the beginning of Chapter 4, I do not think that such an addition would aect my constructions.
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7.3 Ramsey's division
In [Ram25], Frank Ramsey argued that we ought to split the extensional para-
doxes into two now-familiar categories. In modern terms, these are the semantical
paradoxes, such as the satisfaction Liar, and the set-theoretical paradoxes, such as
Russell's paradox of the set that contains only all sets that do not contain themselves.
Despite some objections, such as Graham Priest's [Pri94], this division has guided
much of the literature on the extensional paradoxes. For the most part, resolutions of
the semantical paradoxes try to nd a way to block the derivation of a contradiction
from sentences like \this sentence is false," while the set-theoretical paradoxes are
mostly resolved by insisting that they cannot even get o the ground because they
assume a nave theory of sets, theories of non-wellfounded sets notwithstanding.
By taking this divide-and-conquer approach, most existing resolutions have pur-
chased a simpler theory of truth and meaning with their set theory. Priest's call for a
unied solution is not ignored, but his own paraconsistent approach involves admit-
ting truth-value gluts|admitting that some sentences are both true and false|and
this seems to be too big a pill to swallow for most theorists.
We can see a similar tension arising with the four resolutions I have developed.
The truth-value gap resolution is a unied resolution in the sense that it blocks
every contradiction. The cost of this unication, though, is allowing propositions,
the fundamental bearers of truth, to lack truth values. And notice that this lack of
truth values extends beyond the initially gappy propositions. If x lacks a truth value,
then so does the proposition that x lacks a truth value, on pain of a strengthened
paradox. But then the propositions denoted by sentences like \the proposition that
x lacks a truth value must lack a truth value" must also lack truth values. Indeed,
the propositions we use to capture the core tenets of the truth-value gap theory must
lack truth values. And so must the previous and current sentences!
This is troubling. If, for instance, the goal of assertion is to assert true propo-
sitions, we have failed. But we cannot even say that we have failed|the previous
sentence is neither true nor false, and neither is this one. We can all understand
the problem here, but that understanding cannot involve grasping true propositions.
And, once again, the second conjunct of the previous sentence, along with this sen-
tence, lack truth values. These problems are more serious in this intensional case than
in the extensional analogue: this is not merely an expressive limitation in a language,
but rather a lack of truths to even study.
The truth-value gap resolution, then, purchases a unied resolution of the para-
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doxes and a simple theory of propositions and propositional attitudes at the cost of
our theory of truth.
Similarly, the two-domain resolution retains a simple theory of truth and a rela-
tively simple theory of propositional attitudes, but must purchase this with a theory
of propositions that can (i) allow the ad hoc shifts in quantier domains that the
theory requires and (ii) explain why the propositions required for proposition Liar
and Yablo paradoxes and the variations of the Appendix B paradox cannot exist.
Compressed ramication is simultaneously better and worse o. It must rely on a
theory of propositions for (ii), but orders eliminate the need for (i). But now we must
ask where the orders come from, and I think that any answer to this will have at least
some important consequences for our theory of mental states, since we presumably
must be able to retrieve the orders from such states.
Compressed ramication also suers from a problem similar to the one facing the
truth-value gap resolution. We might try to state one of the core tenets of ramication
by saying, \Every proposition has an order." But we know that this must actually be
equivalent to \Every proposition of order n has an order," and we have no guarantee
that there is an order that contains every proposition. (For traditional ramication,
such an order is impossible; for compressed ramication, it is merely improbable.)
Where the truth-value gap resolution cannot be true because any proposition that
corresponds to it cannot be true (and neither can this sentence, which attempts to
state the problem, be true), a ramied theory of types cannot be true because there
is no proposition that corresponds to it in the rst place. And notice that even that
last claim does not really mean what I want it to mean, because all it actually means
is \there is no proposition of order n that corresponds to it."
One might at this point turn to the machinery discussed in Section 7.2 for help.
These concerns are, after all, similar to to those raised by strengthened paradoxes.
But such machinery has a lot of work to do. We can, it seems, understand these
issues. But understanding is a propositional attitude. So what true propositions are
we grasping when we understand these problems? The problem is one of lacking not
a universal metalanguage, but rather a universal way the world is, and there seems to
me to be no way around this consequence for either the truth-value gap resolution or
ramication. All we can hope to do, I think, is search for an explanation of why this is
not so great a cost to pay. The situation semantics of [BE87] is, I think, particularly
promising as such an explanation, because it does not rely on sentences at all. But
as it does not even begin to address propositional quantication, it is only a promise
at this point.
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Finally, we can see one of the major benets of Prior's approach. By being conser-
vative about the nature of propositions and truth|indeed, by conserving all the intu-
itions that permit the derivation of a contradiction from paradoxical assumptions|it
avoids these problems. But it pays for this by being even less unifying than the quan-
tier domain restriction resolutions, and by giving up some of what we can believe,
what sentences can express, and so on. Prior's approach gives us a story to tell about
the paradoxes, but it is one on which, for instance, thoughts can be blocked by future
states of aairs, which is at least very strange.
I do not pretend to have solved these issues. My goal from the start was only to
develop and explore the space of resolutions of these paradoxes (and even this I have
not completely done, as paraconsistent approaches are notably absent). I hope, at
least, that we now (i) have a better idea of what the available options are, and in
particular realize that the quantier domain restriction approach and Prior's approach
need not be as rigid as they have historically been; and (ii) better understand the
costs and most fundamental commitments of each approach.
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